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International Jurisdiction in Products Liability Cases
(Analysis of Asahi and Post-Asahi Cases)
Chapter I. Introduction
With the increase of foreign trade, more and more foreign manufacturers and
distributors have become involved in products liability litigation in the United States.
Whether the courts in the United States (both federal and state) have jurisdiction over
them or not is a primary concern for those foreign companies.^ In many cases, their
foreign products reach the forum states through the stream of commerce , and then they
are distributed to the U.S. customers by regional distributors, wholesalers and retailers.
Therefore, in many products liability cases in which defective products of foreign
manufacturers and distributors cause injuries to persons in the United States, those
foreign companies do not have a direct relationship with the forum states. Therefore,
they cannot clearly anticipate whether they will be subject to the jurisdiction of the
forum states.
However, those manufacturers and distributors derive legal and economic
benefits fi^om the direct or indirect sale of their products in the forum states, and those
states have an interest in protecting their residents from defective products. It is
' Plaintiffs must bear in mind the enforceability of the judgment. When defendants do
not have assets in the forum state, plaintiffs are forced to seek the recognition and
enforcement of the judgment at a place where the defendant has assets to pay any
resulting judgment. Whether their second forum will recognize and enforce the
judgment of the onginal forum depends on whether the first court has jurisdiction over
the case under the standards of the second forum. Christof Von Dryander, Jurisdiction
m Civil and Commercial Matters under the German Code of Civil Procedure, 16 Intl
Law. 671,672(1982).
1
sometimes unfair to permit them to escape from the reach of the forum state's judicial
power.
The extent and reach of the forum state's judicial power"" are limited by the Due
Process Clause of the United States Constitution,"* and the courts in the United States
have developed and refined the concept of "minimum contacts" through a series of
court decisions in order to assure due process for nonresident defendants.^ Stream of
The forum state's personal jurisdiction is generally classified into two categories:
general jurisdiction and specific jurisdiction. When a defendant has contmuous and
substantial contacts with the forum state, the court has general jurisdiction over the
defendant, and a plaintiff can sue the defendant in the forum state on any claim, even
one that has no connection itself with the forum state. On the other hand, when a
controversy is related to or arises out of a defendant's contacts with the forum, the court
has specific jurisdiction over the defendant as to claims arising out of those contacts,
and a plaintiff can sue the defendant in the forum state although the defendant's
contacts with the forum state are relatively small or isolated, so called "mmimum
contacts." Helicopteros Nacionales De Colombis v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 414 (1984).
This article mainly discusses specific jurisdiction.
^ In Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 732-33 (1877), the Supreme Court of the United
States held that the exercise of a state's jurisdiction was limited by the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution and a judgment inconsistent
with the Due Process Clause was void in the rendering state and was not entitled to full
faith and credit elsewhere. U.S. Const, amend. XIV, §1. "[No State] shall deprive any
person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law." In the same way, the
Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment limits the United States' power to exercise
personal jurisdiction. U.S. Const, amend. V. "[No person shall] be deprived of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law."
^
"Minimum contacts" means the contacts between defendant and forum state which is
required for the exercise of the forum state's personal jurisdiction over the defendant in
order to assure due process for the defendant. In International Shoe Co. v. State of
Washington, Chief Justice Stone wrote, "[d]ue process requires only that in order to
subject a defendant to a judgment in personam, if he be not present within the territory
of the forum, he have certain minimum contacts with it such that the maintenance of the
suit does not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice." 326 U.S.
310 at 316 (1945)(quoting Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940)). See also infra
pp. 5-6.
^ When determining whether a court in the United States has personal jurisdiction over
a nonresident defendant, the court is obligated to engage in two-step analysis: first, the
3commerce theory is advocated in order to show that minimum contacts exist between
the forum state and the nonresident defendant who does not have any direct contact
with the forum state but who has placed its products into the ordinary channels of sale
and has derived a benefit from the resulting sale of its products in the state.^
This article first looks at the origin and the development of the concept of
minimum contacts in the leading United States court cases and then examines the
minimum contacts in the international setting in the decision of the Supreme Court in
court must determine whether the state's long-arm statute and applicable civil rules
confer personal jurisdiction, and second, the court must determine whether granting
jurisdiction under those statute would deprive the defendant of due process. See infra
note 6, Gray v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 22 111. 2d. 432 (1961).
^ The Supreme Court of the United States defined, in World-Wide Volkswagen v.
Woodson, the stream of commerce to mean that "the forum State does not exceed its
power under the Due Process Clause if it asserts personal jurisdiction over a corporation
that delivers its products into the stream of commerce with the expectation that they
will be purchased by consumers in the forum State, and those products substantially
injure forum consumers." 444 U.S. 286, 297-98 (1980).
The theory was first applied in the context of an interstate products liability
action in Gray v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 22 111.2d 432, 442
(1961 ), and then the application of the theory was extended to other type of cases. See
Halm V. Vermont Law School, 698 F.2d 48, 49 (1st Cir. 1983)(breach of contract);
Stabilisierungsfonds Fur Wein v. Kaiser Stuhl Wine Distrib. Pty. Ltd., 647 F.2d 200,
201 (DC. Cir. 1 98 1)(trademark infringement); Data Disc, Inc. v. Systems Technology
Ass'n,551Y.2d 1280, 1283 (9th Cir. 1977)(fi-aud).
In Gray, plaintiff, an Illinois resident, sued an Ohio manufacturer of a hot water
heater safety valve after the hot water tank exploded and injured the plaintiff in Illinois.
The defendant's sole contact with Illinois was that the safety valve, manufactured and
sold in Ohio and incorporated in the water heater by a finished product manufacturer in
Pennsylvania, had malfunctioned and injured plaintiff in Illinois. The Supreme Court
of Illinois recognized the application of the Illinois long-arm statute, and sustained the
jurisdiction of Illinois over the defendant. The court held that the Ohio manufacturer
indirectly derived a substantial benefit fi-om the sales of the finished water heater in
Illinois of which its valve was a component, and benefited from the protection of
Illinois laws. Then the court concluded that the component parts manufacturer was
reasonably required to defend the suit in Illinois, which arose out of the defects in its
products that reached an Illinois consumer "in the ordinar>' course of commerce." 22
I11.2d. at442.
4the Asahi case. Next, this article discusses the federal and state court decisions after
Asaht and looks at how American courts after Asahi have applied the stream of
commerce theory in international settings. The article then reviews foreign countries'
approaches to this problem, especially Japan and European civil law countries. Finally,
this article concludes that foreign manufacturers and distributors, whose products reach
the United States through the normal course of commercial distribution and causes
injuries in the United States, should be subject to the jurisdiction of the courts in the
United States.
Chapter IL Origin and Development of Minimum Contacts
A. International Shoe Co.
In International Shoe Co. v. State of Washington^ the Supreme Court of the
United States laid down the modem approach to the constitutional limitations on a
state's exercise of judicial power over persons outside its boundaries. The Court
abandoned the strict and restrictive jurisdictional principle rendered in Pennoyer v.
Q
Neff, which required the physical presence of a defendant within the boundaries of the
state when served in order to exercise personal jurisdiction over a nonresident
defendant. Instead, the Court in International Shoe established the minimum contacts
test.
326 U.S. 310 (1945). In International Shoe, the State of Washington sued a Delaware
corporation, which had its principle place of business in St. Louis, Missouri, in a court
of Washington seeking to recover contributions for commissions paid its salesmen in
the state under the Washington Unemployment Compensation Act. The defendant
argued that it was not a corporation of the State of Washington and was not doing
business there since all its sales were in interstate commerce rather than local. Then the
defendant insisted that the exercise of jurisdiction by Washington over it was
inconsistent with the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the
Constitution.
^ 95 U.S. 714 (1877). In Pennoyer, the validity of quasi in rem judgment against
nonresident defendant was at issue. The Court ruled for the defendant on the grounds
that the property serving as the basis for jurisdiction was not attached when the
litigation began.
^ Id. at 733. In Pennoyer, the Supreme Court of the United States defined two
fundamental principles that marked the limits of a state's jurisdiction. The first
principle was that "every State possesses exclusive jurisdiction and sovereignty over
persons and property within its territory." Id. at 722. The second principle was that "no
State can exercise direct jurisdiction and authority over persons or property without its
territory." Id. The Court noted that the jurisdiction of a state stemmed from the
authority of an independent state over persons and property within its territory and it
6The Court held that states had jurisdiction over nonresident defendants, if they
had "certain minimum contacts with the forum State" '° such that "the maintenance of
the suit does not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice."" The
Court justified the minimum contacts doctrine by the benefit and protection of the law
of the state in which the defendant exercised the privilege of conducting activities. ^^
The Court stated that "to the extent that a corporation exercises the privilege of
conducting activities within a state," ^^ it was not unreasonable to require the
corporation to respond to a suit in the state, as one of its obligations corresponding to
the exercise of that privilege.''*
Then the Court found substantial contacts between the defendant and the state
which were sufficient to support the claim for taxes on the commissions generated by
the activities of its sales representatives in the state. The Court based its decision on the
facts that the defendant regularly and systematically solicited orders in the state through
eleven to thirteen salesmen employed by the defendant and that the defendant regularly
shipped a substantial volume of merchandise to purchasers within the state. '^ Thus the
was limited by the Constitution. Id. These principle of Pennoyer dominated court
decisions in the United States for over sixty years. However, with the increase of
corporate activities outside the boundaries of the state of incorporation, the courts
developed the fictional concepts of "implied consent," "corporate presence," or "doing
business within the forum State," in order to subject nonresident corporations to a
state's jurisdiction under the principle oiPennoyer.
10 326 U.S. at 316.
"/J.
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Seeld.2i\^\9.
''Id.
'^ See Id.
'^ See Id ax 313-14.
7Court concluded that the exercise of jurisdiction of the court of Washington over the
Delaware corporation did not offend the Due Process Clause.'^
As the Court noted, defendant's contacts with the forum state should be assessed
in light of "the fair and orderly administration of the laws,"''' based on the quality and
nature of defendant's activities. The Court did not require defendant's physical
presence in the forum state for the exercise of jurisdiction. As the result, the Court
opened the way for more flexible and broader application of the state's jurisdiction over
nonresident defendants.
However, the concept of minimum contacts is literally vague, and it does not
necessarily give a clear guidance for nonresident defendants whether they will be
subject to the jurisdiction of a forum state. The concept of minimum contacts and its
relationship with the "notions of fair play and substantial justice"' have been
developed and clarified in the subsequent cases.
B. McGee
Since International Shoe, courts in the United States have relaxed the minimum
contacts requirement and expanded the jurisdiction of states over nonresident
defendants. For example, in McGee v. International Life Ins. Co.^^ the Supreme Court
16 See Id. at 320
'V^. at 319.
18
SeeId.diX2>\(>.
''Id.
^^ 355 U.S. 220 (1957). In McGee, plaintiff was the named beneficiary of an insurance
policy purchased by her son, a California resident. Defendant was a Texas insurance
company that assumed the insurance obligations of a predecessor company. Plaintiffs
son had accepted defendant's offer by mail to insure him and had paid premiums by
mail until he died. When the Texas insurance company refused to pay the proceeds of
the policy, plaintiff sued in a state court in California. The California court rendered
8of the United States sustained the assertion of jurisdiction by a California court over a
nonresident defendant, although the defendant's sole contact with California was only a
single offer of a contract of insurance by mail to the insured. The Court held that, when
"the suit was based on a contract which had substantial connection with [the forum
state],"" the courts have jurisdiction over the nonresident defendant under the Due
Process Clause.
Although the Court referred to the defendant's contacts with the forum state and
minimum contacts were critical elements for the exercise of jurisdiction, the contact
was very limited under the facts in this case.^' The Court did not insist that defendant's
contacts with the forum state be regular or systematic. It was enough that the insurance
company had initiated the contact with a resident, the suit was based on that contact,
and the state had a strong regulatory interest in the subject of the litigation.
Instead of the suit emphasizing the defendant's contacts with the forum state,
the Court emphasized the interest of the forum state, the interest of the plaintiff, the
location of the evidence, and the inconvenience to the defendant."' The Court
examined these factors and concluded that the state's "manifest interest in providing
effective means of redress for its residents"^"* and the plaintiff's interest in suing in the
forum state outweighed the inconvenience to the defendant.^^
judgment for plaintiff, and defendant challenged the court's power to exert personal
jurisdiction over it based on the issuance of a single policy of insurance to a state
resident by mail.
^'/c/. at 223.
^^ See Id. at 222. The defendant had no office or no sales agent in California, and as far
as the record showed it had done no continuous business in California except for the
policy involved in this case. Id.
^^ See Id at 223- 24.
^^ Id at 223.
9The Court expressly stated that its decision relied on the judicial trend toward
the expansion of the scope of a state's judicial power over nonresident defendants.^^
The Court attributed the judicial trend to "the fundamental transformation"^^ of the
national economy which invited a great increase of interstate business activities. In
addition, the Court justified the broad application of the state's jurisdiction by the
development of "modem transportation and communication"^^ which had made the
defense of a suit in foreign state substantially less burdensome for the nonresident
defendant.
C. World-Wide Volkswagen
Contrary to the expansive trend of personal jurisdiction represented by McGee,
in World-Wide Volkswagen v. Woodson,''^ the Supreme Court again restricted the
exercise of a state's personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant, emphasizing the
protection of a nonresident defendant and the need to consider interstate federalism. ^°
Responding to plaintiffs argument that it was foreseeable for the defendants to
be sued in Oklahoma, the Court stated that even though foreseeability was a critical
-^ See Id. at 223-24.
^^ See Id. ^1222-23.
^^ Id at 222.
^^
Id. at 223.
2^ 444 U.S. 286 (1980). In World-Wide Volkswagen, the plaintiffs who were involved in
an automobile accident in Oklahoma sued both the automobile manufacturer, the U.S.
distributor and a regional distributor and local retailer from New York in a state court
of Oklahoma. The Supreme Court held that the court of Oklahoma could not
constitutionally exercise its jurisdiction over the regional distributor and local retailer,
because neither corporation sold cars to Oklahoma customers nor solicited business in
Oklahoma.
^° See Id. at 292.
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element in the due process analysis, it was not the mere likelihood that its product
would reach the forum state, but defendant's reasonable anticipation of "being haled
into court" in the forum state^'that must support the exercise ofjurisdiction.
Then, referring to the Hanson v. Denckla^^ the Court held that when a
defendant "purposefully avails itself of the privilege of conducting activities within the
forum State," the defendant could reasonably anticipate "being haled into court there"
and the exercise of forum state's jurisdiction was reasonable and consistent with the
Due Process Clause. ^^
Id. at 297. The Court stated that, even though it was foreseeable that purchasers of
automobiles in New York may take them to Oklahoma, plaintiffs unilateral activities
of bringing the defendant's products into the forum state were not enough to satisfy the
minimum contacts requirement between the seller and the forum state. Id. To support
its opinion, the Court further indicated that "[i]f foreseeability were the criterion" of the
minimum contacts, "[e]very seller of chattels would in effect appoint the chattel his
agent for service of process," and "[h]is amenability to suit would travel with the
chattel." Id. at 296.
357 U.S. 235 (1958). In Hanson, a settler of a Delaware trust subsequently moved to
Florida and exercised the power of appointment over the trust while living in Florida.
After her death, one of the decedent's children filed suit in a Florida court contesting
the validity of the trust. The Supreme Court of the United States found the contacts
between the Delaware trustee and Florida were insufficient and refused to permit
Florida to exercise jurisdiction over the Delaware trustee. The Court emphasized
defendant's relationship with the forum state and held that no state might assert its
jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant, unless the defendant "purposefully avails
itself of the privilege of conducting activities within the forum state, thus invoking the
benefits and protections of its laws." Id. at 253. Then the Court held that the mere fact
that the settler and most of appointees and beneficiaries were domiciled in Flonda
would not give the court personal jurisdiction over the nonresident trustee. Id. at 254.
"444 U.S. at 297.
'^^
The Court cited the purpose of the Due Process Clause in adding predictability to the
legal system to give a potential defendant assurance as to where he would be sued. See
Id. at 297. Notice that one's activities could subject one to suit in the forum state
makes it reasonable and fair to actually subject the party to the state's power. The
Court stated that when the defendant had clear notice that it could be sued in the forum
state, it could alleviate the risk of litigation "by procunng insurance, passing the
11
Then the Court denied the exercise of persona! jurisdiction of Oklahoma over
the New York corporations, stating that the car owner's unilateral activity in bringing a
product sold by defendant elsewhere into the forum state was not enough to satisfy the
minimum contacts requirement, even though it was foreseeable that purchasers of an
automobile might take it to Oklahoma/^
The majority opinion in World-Wide Volkswagen took a narrow view of the
minimum contacts and denied the exercise of Oklahoma's jurisdiction. Nevertheless,
the Court at the same time approved the stream of commerce theory in dictum. ^^ The
Court stated that:
"[F]orum State does not exceed its powers under the Due Process
Clause if it asserts personal jurisdiction over a corporation that delivers
its products into the stream of commerce with the expectation that they
will be purchased by consumers in the forum State, and those products
subsequently injure forum consumers."
expected costs on to customers, or, if the risks are too great, severing its connection
with the State." Id See also Shaferv. Heitner 433 U.S. 186,218(1977).
^^ In his dissenting opinion. Justice Brennan contended that the majority "focused too
tightly on the existence of contacts between the forum state and the defendant" placing
too "little weight to the strength of the forum state's interest in the case and fail to
explore whether there would be any actual inconvenience to the defendant." Id. at 299.
Justice Brennan further stated that:
"It is difficult to see why the Constitution should distinguish between a
case involving goods which reach a distant State through a chain of
distribution and a case involving goods which reach the same State
because a consumer, using them as the dealer knew the customer would,
took them there. In each case the seller purposefully injects the goods
into the stream of commerce and those goods predictably are used in the
forum State." Id. at 306-07.
^^ The stream of commerce theory was approved several times in the lower courts after
Grav. However, World-Wide Volkswagen was the first case in which the Supreme
Court of the United States approved the theory.
" Id. at 297-98. The Court cited Gray in support of this proposition. See supra note 6.
12
Although, the Supreme Court approved the stream of commerce theory in
dictum in World-Wide Volkswagen, whether the Court would be satisfied merely by a
defendant's act of placing its product in the stream of commerce or whether it would
require defendant's further action in more purposefully directing its marketing efforts at
the forum state was not spelled out.^^ The lower courts struggled with interpreting the
language in World-Wide Volkswagen and reached inconsistent conclusions in
subsequent cases. ^^
In Wide-World Volkswagen, the Court further articulated a two-prong analysis'*^
enumerating multiple factors to be considered in the fairness and reasonableness test.
^^ See 4^0 U.S. 102, 110-12.
Some courts read the Court in World-Wide Volkswagen to allow the exercise of
personal jurisdiction based merely on a defendant's activity of placing the product in
the stream of commerce aware that it would reach the forum state through the action of
others. See Bean Dredging Corp. v. Dredge Technology Corp., 744 F.2d 1081 (5th Cir.
1 984 )(Where a component parts manufacturer in Washington placed its products into
the stream of commerce without limiting the states in which the products would be
sold, the Fifth Circuit found sufficient minimum contacts between the manufacturer and
State of Louisiana.); Hedrick v. Shoji Co., 715 F.2d 1355 (9th Cir. 1983)(The Ninth
Circuit Court affirmed the exercise of jurisdiction of Oregon over the Japanese
manufacturer in a products liability case stating that "[a] manufacturer or supplier of a
defective products who knew or should have known that a product would enter the
stream of foreign commerce can be subjected, consistently with due process, to a forum
state's long-arm jurisdiction and be sued in the forum where the injury occurred.").
Other courts understood that the World-Wide Volkswagen court required defendant's
activities be more purposefully directed toward the forum state rather than merely
placing its product in the stream of commerce knowing its destination. See Humble v.
Toyota Motor Co., 727 F.2d 709 (8th Cir. 1984)(The Eighth Circuit denied the
jurisdiction of Iowa over a Japanese car seat manufacturer in a product liability case
finding that the "defective product has not been designed, marketed, or placed into the
American commerce by (the defendant), even though the Japanese manufacturer could
foresee that its product would reach the United States.").
'^^ See Id. at 292. The Court stated that determination of personal jurisdiction begins
with consideration of whether a nonresident defendant had minimum contacts such that
the defendant purposefully availed himself of the benefit of the forum state. Id. at 297.
Only if minimum contacts are present, should the reasonableness and fairness of the
forum state's exercise ofjurisdiction be considered. Id. at 294.
13
As those multiple factors, the Court indicated (1) "the burdens on the defendant," (2)
"the forum State's interest in adjudicating the dispute," (3) "the plaintiffs interest in
obtaining convenient and effective relief," (4) "the interstate judicial system's interest
in obtaining the most efficient resolution of controversies," and (5) "the shared interest
of the several States in furthering fundamental substantive social policies."^' These
multiple factors were refined and restated in Burger King and Asahi. Emphasizing the
territorial limitation on the sovereign power of each state from the point of federalism,
however, the Court concluded that the interstate federalism concerns superseded the
consideration of other multiple factors.'*^
D. Burger King Corp.
Reflecting the different views of the Due Process Clause's limitation on a state's
jurisdiction, the courts in the United States went in two divergent directions. In
addition, even after World-Wide Volkswagen, the relationship between the minimum
contacts test and the fairness and reasonableness test had not been clarified. In Burger
King Corp. v. Rudzewicz,^^ Justice Brennan established a general framework for the due
process analysis and utilized a two-pronged test.
41 ,j
lU.
42 The Court stated that:
"Even if the defendant would suffer minimal or no inconvenience from
being forced to litigate before the tribunal of another State; even if the
forum State has a strong interest in applying its law to the controversy;
even if the forum State is the most convenient location for litigation, the
Due Process Clause, acting as an instrument of interstate federalism, may
sometimes act to divest the State of its power to render a valid judgment."
Id
^- 471 U.S. 462 (1985). In Burger King, a national franchiser sued a Michigan
franchisee in the national company's headquarters state of Florida alleging breach of
franchise obligations and trademark infringement. The Supreme Court of the United
14
Justice Brennan first looked to the contacts of the nonresident defendant with
the forum state. He held that the purpose of the Due Process Clause was to add
predictability as to whether the potential defendant could be sued in the forum state.'*'*
Thus, if the defendant had "purposefully directed""*^ his activities toward the residents
of the forum state, and the litigation had arisen out of or related to those activities, the
defendant had a fair warning and a reasonable expectation of being sued in the forum
state.'*^
In referring to the stream of commerce theory, Justice Brennan stated that the
"forum State does not exceed its power under the Due Process Clause if it asserts
personal jurisdiction over a corporation that delivers its products into the stream of
commerce with the expectation that they will be purchased by consumers in the forum
State' and those products subsequently injure forum consumers. Thus, in Burger
King, Justice Brennan reaffirmed again in dicta the stream of commerce theory
articulated in World-Wide Volkswagen, and attributed the legitimacy of the theory to a
States recognized defendant's minimum contacts with Florida and affirmed the exercise
of jurisdiction of Florida over the Michigan franchisee where the Michigan
businessmen entered into a contract subjecting their local franchise to control by the
national company and agreeing to make substantial payments to the franchiser at its
Florida headquarters over a 20-year period.
^^ See Id. at 472.
'^^
Id. The "purposefully directed" phrase was intentionally used by Justice Brennan in
order to include within the scope of the minimum contacts a nonresident defendant's
out-of-state activities that cause effects in the forum state.
'''See Id.
^'^
Id. at 473.
15
fair warning and a reasonable prediction that the defendant would be sued in the forum
state.'^
Further, Justice Brennan explained that purposefully-established minimum
contacts must be found before the examination of the fairness and reasonableness of
subjecting the defendant to litigation in the forum state. He stated that "[o]nce it has
been decided that a defendant purposefully established minimum contacts within the
forum state, these contacts may be considered in the light of other factors to determine
whether the assertion of personal jurisdiction would comport with "fair play and
substantial justice. "^^
In addition, the Court articulated the relationship between the minimum contacts
test and the fairness and reasonableness test, holding that: ( 1 ) even if the minimum
contacts are slight, so long as the fairness and reasonableness is strong, courts have
jurisdiction over the defendant,^^ (2) if the defendant purposefully directed his activities
toward the forum state so that the minimum contacts test is plainly satisfied, the burden
of the proof shifts to the defendant to show that other factors might make jurisdiction
unreasonable,^' and (3) even if the defendant purposefully engaged in the activities
within the forum state and the minimum contacts requirements are satisfied, the
defendants can avoid the exercise of state's jurisdiction over them by the strong
''* As the reason to make the exercise of forum state's jurisdiction legitimate, the court
noted that, ( 1 ) a state has a "manifest interest" in providing a convenient forum for its
residents and protecting them from the injuries caused by the defendant's out-of-state
activities, (2) it is unfair to allow nonresident defendant to escape from the obligation
arising from interstate activities, and (3) owing to the modem transportation and
communication it had become less burdensome for the defendants to litigate in the
another forum's jurisdiction. See Id. at 473-74.
'^^ Mat 476.
^^ See /J. at 474.
^VSee/^. at477.
16
showing of unfairness or unreasonableness.^^ Thus, Justice Brennan clarified the
minimum contacts test and showed how it and the fairness and reasonableness test are
mutually related each other.
As the factors to be considered in the fairness and reasonableness test at the
second prong, Justice Brennan examined five factors enumerated in World-Wide
Volkswagen and considered the concrete interests of each party and the forum state.
Then considering defendant's substantial and continuous relationship with Florida and
defendant's failure to show the unfairness and unreasonableness of the exercise of
jurisdiction in Florida,^^ he concluded that the exercise of long-arm jurisdiction over the
defendant did not offend the Due Process Clause.
E. Asahi
Although the minimum contacts test had evolved primarily in domestic cases, in
Asahi Metal Industry Co. v. Superior Court ofCalifornia, ^'^ the Supreme Court applied
the minimum contacts test to the international context. In this case the Court first
unanimously held that it would be unfair and unreasonable for a court of California to
exert jurisdiction over a Japanese component parts manufacturer for an indemnification
cross-claim by the Taiwanese manufacturer of the final product, once the products
liability claim by the injured plaintiff had been settled and dismissed. On the issue of
whether the Japanese manufacturer had established minimum contacts with California,
the Court was severely divided into two four-justice plurality opinions, and a third
opinion by the ninth justice. As the result of its fractured opinion, the Court failed to
'^See/t/. at 477-78.
^^ See Id at 487.
54 480 U.S. 102(1987).
17
provide a clear standard for lower courts and both state and federal courts have
struggled to apply Asahi and have not done so consistently."
55 See infra Chapter IV.
Chapter HL Asahi
A. Background
In 1978 while Gary Zurcher was driving his Honda motorcycle in California, he
lost control of his motorcycle and caused an accident in which he was severely injured
and his wife was killed.^^ In September 1979, Zurcher and his deceased wife's children
filed a product liability action in a court of California against Cheng Shin Rubber
Industrial Co., Ltd. (Cheng Shin), a Taiwanese manufacturer of the tire tube, and
Sterling May Co., a California retailer. ^^ Zurcher alleged in the complaint that the
accident was caused by a defect of the tire manufactured by Cheng Shin. Cheng Shin,
in turn, filed a cross-complaint seeking indemnity from its co-defendants and from
Asahi Metal Industry Co., Ltd. (Asahi), a Japanese manufacturer of the tire tube's valve
assembly. Asahi moved to quash Cheng Shin's service of summons, arguing that
Asahi did not have the required minimum contacts with California, so that the exercise
of personal jurisdiction over Asahi would be inconsistent with the Due Process Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution.^^ Zurcher's claims
against Cheng Shin and the other defendants were eventually settled and dismissed.
56 5ee480U.S. 102 at 105.
^'' See Id. Sit \06.
^^ See Id.
^^ See Id
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leaving only Cheng Shin's indemmW action against Asahi pending in the California
. 60
court.
The trial court found the following facts. Asahi is a major manufacturer of tire
valve assemblies in Japan and sells its assemblies to several manufacturers including
Cheng Shin for the use as component parts in tire tube products.^' Asahi had done
substantial business with Cheng Shin for ten years, exporting its valve assemblies from
Japan to Taiwan,^' although the sales to Cheng Shin represented a small portion of
Asahi 's gross income.^' Cheng Shin purchased valve assemblies from other suppliers
as well, and sold its final products all over the world including the United States.^
Even though Asahi did not have direct contact with California, substantial numbers of
Asahi 's valve assemblies reached California after being incorporated in tires. ^^ While
Asahi was aware that the valve assemblies sold to Cheng Shin would reach Califomia,^^
^"^ See Id.
^^ See Id.
" See Id. In 1978, Cheng Shin bought 150,000 tire valve assemblies from Asahi. In
1979; 500,000. In 1980; 500,000. In 1981; 100,000. In 1982; 100,000. See Id.
^^ See Id. The sales to Cheng Shin represented 1.24 percent of Asahi's gross income in
1981 and 0.44 percent of its gross income in 1982. See Id.
^ See Id. Cheng Shin alleged that the sale to California amounted to approximately 20
percent of the sale in the United States. See Id.
^^ See Id. at 107. In 1983 an attorney for Cheng Shin conducted an informal
examination of the tire tubes sold in a Solano Country motorcycle store, finding that
among 1 15 tire tubes in the store, 97 were manufactured in Japan or in Taiwan. Among
97 Japanese or Taiwanese tubes, 21 contained Asahi valve assemblies. Among 21
Asahi valve stems, 12 were incorporated into Cheng Shin tire tubes. The store
contained 41 other Cheng Shin tubes that incorporated the valve assemblies of other
manufacturers.
^ See Id. In an affidavit, a manager of Cheng Shin stated that he would have discussed
with Asahi the fact that Cheng Shin's tubes were sold throughout the world and
specifically in the United States. See Id.
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Asahi's president declared that Asahi never contemplated that sales to Cheng Shin in
Taiwan would subject it to litigation in Califomia.^^
The Superior Court of California denied Asahi's motion to quash service of
summons, finding that "Asahi had the requisite minimum contacts with California and
that jurisdiction was fair and reasonable. "^^ The court relied on the following factors:
( 1
)
a significant number of tubes with Asahi valve assemblies were sold in California,
(2) Asahi sold a substantial number of valve assemblies to Cheng Shin, (3) Cheng Shin
was doing substantial business with California, and (4) Asahi knew that its valve
assemblies would be incorporated into tubes sold m Califomia.^^
The California Court of Appeals'''^ issued a writ of mandate ordering the
Superior Court of California to quash service of summons,^' holding that mere
foreseeability that some of its products incorporated into final products would be used
in California was not a sufficient basis for requiring Asahi to defend this action a
California court.
The Supreme Court of California reversed the decision of the Court of
Appeals,''^ holding that the minimum contacts requirement was satisfied when a
'''^
See Id.
^^ Zurcher v. Dunlop Tire & Rubber Co., No. 76180 (Super. Ct., Solano County, Cal.,
Apr. 20, 1983).
^^ See Id. at 107. The Supreme Court of California stated that it was not unreasonable
for Asahi to defend products defect claims on an international scale, since Asahi was
doing business on an international scale. See Id.
^^ 147 Cal. App.3d 30 (Ct. App. 1985).
'^^ Seeld.dXlAA.
''^ See Id
^'39Cal.3d35(1985).
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component parts manufacturer intentionally sold its products to another manufacturer,
icnowing that its component parts incorporated into final products would be sold in the
forum State. The court held that: (1) Asahi was doing substantial business in
California through Cheng Shin and indirectly benefited fi-om these sales of finished
products including its component parts/^ (2) Asahi knew that some of its products
would probably reach to California''^ and should reasonably have anticipated being
haled into court in California/^ Then the court concluded that even though Asahi did
not have direct ties with Califomia^^ and did not design or control the distribution
system that carried its valve assemblies into California/^ Asahi had sufficient contacts
with California so that the exercise of jurisdiction over Asahi was consistent with
constitutional due process.
The Supreme Court of California further examined whether the exercise of
jurisdiction satisfied the fairness and reasonableness test. Although the court
acknowledged that the state's interests was not so strong as if it were directly providing
a means of redress for its injured resident, the California court found the state had a
O 1
substantial interest in asserting jurisdiction over Asahi. First, the state had an interest
in protecting its consumers through having foreign manufacturers comply with state
'^^ See Id. at 50.
'^^SeeJdaXAS.
^^ See Id.
'''^
See Id
"^^ See Id.
''''
See Id at 49.
^^ See Id at 52-53.
^\See Id. at 53.
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safety standards. Second, the state had an interest in the administration of its laws and
had jurisdiction when most of the evidence was within its boundaries. Third, the state
had an interest in avoiding conflicting decision with foreign countries.
The Supreme Court of the United States granted certiorari and reversed the
decision of the Supreme Court of Cahfomia. Following the decision in Burger King,
the court used the two-prong analysis to determine whether California could exert
jurisdiction over Asahi consistent with due process.
B. Holding
1. Minimum Contacts
While all nine justices agreed that the exercise ofjurisdiction by California over
Asahi on the indemnity claim was inconsistent with the Due Process Clause, the Court
was sharply divided into three opinions on the issue of whether the placement of the
products into the stream of commerce with awareness that the products would reach the
forum state would satisfy the minimum contacts test. Justice O'Connor wrote for four
judges and ruled that Asahi lacked minimum contacts with California. Justice
Brennan, writing for four justices, found jurisdiction based on the stream of commerce
could be upheld.^^ Justice Stevens, the ninth justice, found that examination of
minimum contacts was not necessary since the court found the exercise of the
jurisdiction was unfair to the defendant.^ The confusion in the Court's opinion
^" Asahi, 480 U.S. at 104 (1987). Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justice Powell, and Justice
Scalia joined in Justice O'Connor's opinion. Id.
^^ See Id. at 116. Justice White, Justice Marshall and Justice Blackmun joined in
Justice Brennan's opinion. Id. Note that Justice White, the author of the World-Wide
Volkswagen, supported Justice Brennan's opinion regarding the stream of commerce.
^ See Id. at 121 Justice White and Justice Blackmun joined in Justice Steven's
opinion..
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reflected the justices' different views on the stream of commerce theory and the
limitation of the state's judicial power over nonresident defendants.
In Part II-A of her opinion. Justice O'Connor focused her examination on the
defendant's action in the forum state as the basis of minimum contacts, and she held
that when the defendant purposefully avails itself of the privilege of conducting
activities within the forum state, it was not unreasonable to subject the defendant to suit
there. For the exercise of personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant. Justice
O'Connor required ''substantial connection" between the defendant and the forum
state originating from the defendant's activities "purposefully directed" toward the
forum state. She then concluded that the mere act of placing a product into the stream
of commerce, with awareness that continuing commercial transactions would sweep the
product into the forum state, was not enough to conclude that the defendant parts
manufacturer had purposefully directed activities toward the forum state.
To make defendant's activities count as purposefully directed toward the forum
state, Justice O'Connor would require that defendant engage in additional conduct
indicating an intent or purpose to serve the market in the forum state. As such
additional conduct by the defendant, Justice O'Connor listed acts like (1) "designing the
product for the market in the forum State," (2) "advertising in the forum State," (3)
"establishing channels for providing regular advice to customers in the forum State," or
*^ See Id. at 110. In this context. Justice O'Connor noted Hanson and World-Wide
Volkswagen. See supra pp. 9-13.
86 See Burger King, 471 U.S. at 475, and McGee, 355 U.S. at 223.
^"^
The phrase of "purposefully directed" was first used in Burger King, by Justice
Brennan. See Burger King , 471 U.S. at 476 . See also supra note 45.
^^SeeAsahi,4S0\].S.a.X 112
^^ See Id. a.t ni.
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(4) "marketing the product through a distributor who has agreed to serve as the sales
agent in the forum State."^^ Then, examining the acts of Asahi toward California,
Justice O'Connor concluded that the exercise of personal jurisdiction over Asahi by the
Superior Court of California exceeded the limits of due process, since Asahi did none of
the acts that could turn selling a component to the manufacturer of the finished product
outside the United States into "purposefully directing" its products to California by
engaging in efforts to market its products there. ^'
Justice Brennan rejected Justice O'Conner's approach that required a defendant
to have additional contacts beyond placing its products into the stream of the commerce
aware that it would reach the forum state. ^'^ Justice Brennan noted that "the stream of
commerce refers not to unpredictable current or eddies, but to the regular and
anticipated flow of products from manufacturer to distribution to retail sale."^^ Justice
Brennan reasoned that as long as the defendant put the products into the stream of
commerce aware that its products would reach to the forum state, the lawsuit in the
forum state is not a surprise for the defendant.^"* Further, he argued that the defendant
""Id.
'' See Id. at 112-13. Justice O'Connor examined Asahi's conduct and stated that (1)
"[T]here is no evidence that Asahi designed its product" for the market in California,
(2) Asahi "does not advertise or otherwise solicit business in California," (3) "Asahi
does not do business in California," and "[I]t has no office, agents, employees, or
property in California," (4) "[I]t did not create, control, or employ the distribution
system that brought its valves to California."
^^ See Id. at 1 16-17. Justice Brennan stated that this is one of those rare cases in which
"minimum contacts requirements inherent in the concept of 'fair play and substantial
justice'... defeat the reasonableness of jurisdiction even [though] the defendant has
purposefully engaged in forum activities." Id. (quoting Burger King, 471 U.S. at 477-
78).
^^M at 117.
^^ See Id
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who had placed its products in the stream of commerce benefited directly or indirectly
from the sale of the products in the forum state regardless of whether the defendant
"directly conducts busmess in the forum state, or engages in additional conduct directed
toward the forum State."^^
Justice Brennan objected that Justice O'Conner's opinion represented a marked
retreat from the Court's analysis in World-Wide Volkswagen, noting that the Court m
World-Wide Volkswagen carefully distinguished the case in which the defendant's
products reached a forum state through a regular chain of distribution from the case in
which the consumer fortuitously transported defendant's products to the forum state.^^
In the former case. Justice Brennan noted that, according to World-Wide Volkswagen,
due process merely requires the defendant's expectation that their products would be
purchased by consumers in the forum state once the defendant delivered its products
into the stream of commerce.
Justice Brennan also noted that in World-Wide Volkswagen the Court had cited
Gray in which the Supreme Court of Illinois applied the stream of commerce theory
and asserted jurisdiction over a component parts manufacturer that did not have direct
contact with Illinois.^^ He concluded from the facts that Asahi was aware of the
operation of the distribution system and Asahi received economic benefit from the sales
^^
Id. He pointed out that "most courts and commentators have found that jurisdiction
premised on the placement of a product into the stream of commerce is consistent with
the Due Process Clause, and have not required a showing of additional conduct." Id. at
117.
^ See Id. at 118-20. The Court held that consumer's unilateral activities of bringing
defendant's products into the forum state was, even if it was foreseeable, not a
sufficient constitutional basis for personal jurisdiction over the defendant. See World-
Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 295. See supra note 31.
^^ Asahi, 480 U.S. at 1 19-20. See Supra p. 1 1
.
^^ See supra note 6.
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in California. Thus, shipping tire valve assemblies to Taiwan with notice that they
would be incorporated in tires sold to the U.S. market was sufficient to support a
finding that minimum contacts existed between Asahi and the state where its product
eventually caused harm to a consumer. ^^
Justice Stevens concurred in the judgment. If the exercise ofjurisdiction by the
forum state was unreasonable and unfair, examination of minimum contacts was not
necessary to determine whether a state court's assertion of personal jurisdiction was
constitutional.'^*^ Nevertheless, Jusitice Stevens rejected Justice O'Connor's distinction
between a "mere awareness" that a component would find its way into the forum state
and "purposeful availment" of the forum's market. '°' Instead, Justice Stevens asserted
that the purposeful availment determination in the stream of commerce setting required
"a constitutional determination that is affected by the volume, the value and the
hazardous character of the components. "'°" Then he implicitly recognized minimum
contacts between Asahi and California, stating "a regular course of dealing that results
in deliveries of over 100,000 units annually over a period of several years would
constitute "purposeful availment" even though the item delivered to the forum state was
a standard products marketed throughout the world.
'
99 SeeAsahL4S0U.S.atl2\.
'°° Justice Stevens found that "this case fit within the rule that minimum requirement
inherent in the concept of 'fair play and substantial justice' may defeat the
reasonableness of jurisdiction even if the defendant has purposefully engaged in forum
activities." Id. at 121-22. (quoting Burger King, All U.S. at 477-78).
'°'
.See Mat 122.
'^^
Id. Justice Stevens noted that over the course of its dealings with Cheng Shin, Asahi
had arguably engaged in a higher quantum of conduct than "[t]he placement of a
product into the stream of commerce, without more." Id.
103
Id.
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2. Traditional Notions of Fair Play and Substantial Justice
After addressing the role of fairness and reasonableness in the due process
analysis, ^^ the Court evaluated five factors articulated in World-Wide Volkswagen and
restated in Burger King,^^^ and concluded that the exercise of personal jurisdiction over
Asahi would be unreasonable and unfair. '^^ Justice O'Connor delivered the opinion of
the Court. Eight Justices concurred in her opinion in this section in ruling that the
1 AT
indemnity cross complaint by Cheng Shin against Asahi should be dismissed.
First, the Court determined that the burden on the defendant was severe. '^^ As
the special circumstances of this case which imposed a severe burden on Asahi, the
Court noted that Asahi would have been compelled to traverse the long distance from
Asahi's Japanese headquarters to the forum in California and Asahi must submit its
'^'^ See Id. at 113. Quoting International Shoe, Justice O'Connor stated that "[t]he
strictures of the Due Process Clause forbid a state court to exercise personal jurisdiction
over Asahi under circumstances that would offend traditional notions of fair play and
substantial justice." Id.
'^^ As the factors to be considered in the fairness and reasonableness test, the Court
noted five points. ( 1 ) "the burden on the defendant," (2) "the interests of the forum
State," (3) "the plaintiffs interest in obtaining relief," (4) "the interstate judicial
system's interest in obtaining the most efficient resolution of controversies," and (5)
"the shared interest of the several States in furthering fundamental substantive social
policies." Id. at 113. See supra pp. 13,16.
106 Seeld.atWe.
'°^ Only Justice Scalia dissented in this section. Justice Scalia joined Justice
O'Connor's opinion in the first prong analysis. However, he did not joined in Justice
O'Connor's opinion in fairness and reasonableness test. His position implied that once
the court found defendant's insufficient contacts with forum state, it was not necessary
to assess the fairness and reasonableness for the exercise of state's jurisdiction. His
position reflected the two-pronged analysis in Burger King, in which the Court required
the presence of purposefully established minimum contacts before examining the
fairness and reasonableness of the exercise ofjurisdiction.
108 See Id. at 114.
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dispute with Cheng Shin to a foreign legal system. '^^ The Court then stated that the
"[u]nique burdens placed upon one who must defend oneself in a foreign legal system
should have significant weight in assessing the reasonableness of stretching the long
arm of personal jurisdiction over national borders.""^
Second, the Court discussed the interests of the plaintiff and the forum state. ^"
The Court noted that "[w]hen minimum contacts have been established, often the
interests of the plaintiff and the forum in the exercise of jurisdiction will justify even
the serious burdens placed on the alien defendant."' ^^ However, the Court found that
here these mterests were slight and did not justify the serious burdens on the
defendant."^
The Court reasoned that Cheng Shin had not demonstrated that California was a
more convenient forum than Taiwan or Japan for the litigation of the indemnification
claim between these Taiwanese and Japanese corporations."'* The Court also found
that the interest of California had considerably diminished, because neither party was a
resident in California, and it was uncertain whether California law would govern the
indemnit>' claim.
'''See Id.
'''Id.
Ill
See Id.
'''Id
""^ See Id
'"See Id
"^ See Id. at 1 14-15. The Court rejected the assertion of Supreme Court of California
that the state had an interest in protecting its consumers by ensuring tort foreign
manufacture comply with the state's safety standard. The Court reasoned that California
could deter component part manufacturers indirectly from unsafe practice by exercising
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Finally, the Court considered the interests of the "several States" in the efficient
judicial resolution of the dispute and the advancement of substantive policies."^ The
Court held that, in international cases like Asahi, those interests were represented by
"the procedural and substantive policies of other nations whose interests are affected by
the assertion of jurisdiction by the California court.""'' Although, the Court did not
apply these international interests in this case, it indicated that those interests "as well
I 1 R
as the Federal interest in Government's foreign relations policies," would "be best
served by a careful inquiry into the reasonableness of the assertion ofjurisdiction in the
particular case, and an unwillingness to find the serious burdens on an alien defendant
outweighed by minimal interests on the part of the plaintiff or the forum State.""^
C. Analysis
1. Fairness and Reasonableness
As stated in part II-B, both parties in the dispute of Cheng Shin's
indemnification claim in Asahi were foreign corporations and no forum resident was
involved in this dispute. ^^° In addition, Cheng Shin's indemnification claim was based
on the contract between a Taiwanese corporation and a Japanese corporation, and
jurisdiction over the manufacturers and sellers of the final products. See 480 U.S. at
115.
116
See Id.
"'/c/.
"«M
""^
/t/. The Court further noted that "[g]reat care and reserve should be exercised when
extending our notions of personal jurisdiction into the international field" (referring
United States v. First National City Bank, 379 U.S. 378 (1965)).
^^^ See supra P.27.
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related to the shipment from Japan to Taiwan. ^^' Therefore, the interests of California
to resolve Cheng Shin's indemnification claim in that forum were very limited. Further,
the interest of Cheng Shin in obtaining the relief in California was not so strong because
Cheng Shin could seek the relief in the courts of Taiwan or Japan even if the
jurisdiction of California were denied. "" In addition, the burden on Asahi to defend
litigation in California was very severe.'"^ Asahi's officials must travel the long
distance from the Japanese headquarters to the forum in California to attend the trial,
and Asahi must submit its documents under an unfamiliar foreign country's judicial
system. In the light of these facts, the burden on Asahi overcame the interests of Cheng
Shin and the State of California. The Court correctly held that the exercise of
jurisdiction of California against Asahi was unfair and unreasonable on this claim for
indemnity.
However, Asahi should be distinguished from the case where a resident of the
forum state sues a foreign corporation to recover injuries suffered in the forum state. In
such case, both the plaintiff and the forum state may have strong interests in asserting
jurisdiction over the foreign company. The forum state has a strong interest in
providing an effective means of redress for its injured resident who would find it
impractical to sue in the defendant's home jurisdiction. A resident plaintiff has a strong
interest in avoiding the expenses, inconvenience, and potential bias of the foreign
defendant's jurisdiction.'^'* The assertion of jurisdiction over a foreign corporation in
these circumstances is not necessarily unfair and unreasonable.
^^^ SeeAsahi,4S0V.S.at\\5.
See supra p. 27.
'^^ See supra pp. 26-27.
'^'^
This alternative handicaps a resident plaintiff in several ways. First, litigating in a
foreign country is extremely expensive. Second, foreign courts may be unfamiliar with
31
2. Federalism and International Considerations
Following the admonishment of World-Wide Volkswagen, the Supreme Court in
Asahi emphasized the "shared interest of the several States in furthering fundamental
substantive social policies." ' Then the court further held that, in an international case
like Asahi, this substantial social policy is represented by the consideration on "the
procedural and substantive policies of other nations whose interests are affected by the
assertion ofjurisdiction by the California court."'^^
Certainly, the assertion of a state's jurisdiction over a foreign defendant affects
the foreign relations of the United States by creating the possibility of retaliatory actions
by other nations. Further, it necessarily involves each state in the scope of the federal
power over foreign relations and foreign commerce to a constitutionally impermissible
degree. In international cases like Asahi, courts need to pay a special caution to the
fairness and reasonableness of the limitation on the state's judicial power, international
relationships, and the government's foreign policies.
However, the federalism consideration should not be given too much weight in
the due process analysis. The argument for limitation based on federalism is that the
states stand as coequal sovereigns and possess rights against each other. Therefore, a
state may not assert jurisdiction over a person or property located in another state.
United States products liability laws that may govern the case. Finally, other countries'
courts may be biased in favor of a national defendant, applying their own products
liability laws, which generally offer plaintiffs fewer chances of recovery.
'^^ Asahi, 480 U.S. at 1 13. In World-Wide Volkswagen, the Supreme Court held that the
interstate federalism concerns superseded the considerations of other factors in the
fairness and reasonableness test. See World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at, 292.
^^\See Asahi, 4S0 U.S. at \\5.
'^^ See Bruce N. Morton, Contacts, Fairness and State Interests: Personal Jurisdiction
After Asahi Metal Industry Co. v. Superior Court ofCalifornia, 9 Pace L. Rev. 451, 489
(1989).
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because to do so would violate a right possessed by another coequal sovereign. This
territorial sovereignty theory of jurisdiction is traditionally traced to the case of
Pennoyer. The argument is based on the contention that the several states of the
United States are in all respects like independent countries, expect insofar as the federal
constitution controls. The Pennoyer Court never asserted that there was a direct
constitutional basis for the territorial theory ofjurisdiction, but rather assumed that this
theory followed from the concept of sovereignty rooted in international law as that
concept extended to the United States' federal system. However, when a product
manufacturer in a foreign country caused injuries to persons in another country, the
manufacturer has already invaded another country's sovereign power through the sale of
its defective product in that country. Therefore, the foreign countries' sovereign power
itself is not a reason to reserve the judicial power of the forum state. Further, in
international law, the right to assert immunity from jurisdiction belongs to the nation
and does not belong to the individual defendant. Territorial sovereignty does not
provide a theoretical basis for the right of a foreign defendant to move for a dismissal of
an action on the grounds of absence of personal jurisdiction.
The purpose of due process is to protect the liberty of individuals by providing a
potential defendant assurance as to where he will be sued.'" As the Supreme Court of
'^^ Pennoyer, 95 U.S. 714 (1877). In Pennoyer, the Supreme Court established two
principles of public law respecting the jurisdiction of an independent state over person
and property: First is that "every State possesses exclusive jurisdiction and sovereignty
over persons and property within its territory." Second is that "no State can exercise
direct jurisdiction and authonty over persons or property without its territory." Id. at
733. See supra note 9.
'^^ See Yvonne Luketich Blaauvelt, Personal Jurisdiction After Asahi Metal Industry
Co., V. Superior Court ofCalifornia, 49 Ohio St. L.J. 853, 856 (1988).
"Although interstate federalism is an important federal constitutional concern,
the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment does not address that
concern. The purpose of the due process clause is to protect person against
unfair or arbitrary treatment at the hand of the government. If the due process
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the United States stated in Insurance Corp. oflrelamd Ltd. v. Compagnie des Bauxites
de Guinee, the federahsm consideration is not relevant with the Due Process Clause. '^^
3. The Stream of Commerce
The stream of commerce is a "regular and anticipated flow of products from
manufacture to distribution to retail sale."^^' Once a participant in this process places
its products in the stream of commerce, knowing that "the final product is being
marketed in the form State," these manufacturers can reasonably anticipate being
sued in the forum state. In addition, the burden on the defendant to litigate in the forum
state corresponds to the defendants' economic and legal benefit "from the retail sale of
the final product in the forum State. "'^^ Therefore the exercise of the forum state's
jurisdiction over foreign manufacturers is not inconsistent with the Due Process Clause,
standard m the International Shoe makes it fair to adjudicate in the court of one
state, then the interests of federalism, embodied in the frill faith and credit
clause of article IV of the Constitution, will be served by requiring that all states
give effect to that state's judgment."
'^^
In Insurance Corp., ofIreland Ltd. v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S.
694, 703 (1982), note 10, the Supreme Court stated that:
"The restriction on state sovereign power described in World-Wide
Volkswagen Corp., however, must be seen as ultimately a ftmction of the
individual liberty interest preserved by the Due Process Clause. That
Clause is the only source of the personal jurisdiction requirement and the
Clause itself makes no mention of federal concerns. Furthermore, if the
federalism concept operated as an independent restriction on the
sovereign power of the court, it would not be possible to waive the
personal jurisdiction requirement: Individual actions cannot change the
powers of sovereignty, although the individual can subject himself to
powers from which he may otherwise be protected."
'^' Asahi, 480 U.S. at 1 17.(Brennan, J.)
''' Id
''' Id
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as far as they have placed their products into the stream of commerce with the
awareness that their products will reach the forum states.''''*
In World-Wide Volkswagen, the Supreme Court approved in dictum the forum
state's exercise of personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant that delivered its
products into the stream of commerce with the expectation that its products would be
purchased by consumers in the forum state. '^^ To satisfy the purposeful availment
requirement, the Court did not require any additional conduct other than defendant's
"expectation" of purchase of the products in the forum state. By requiring defendant's
additional conduct. Justice O'Cormor in Asahi imposed artificial barriers to personal
jurisdiction and implicitly rejected the stream of commerce theory endorsed in World-
Wide Volkswagen. Justice O'Connor overlooked the fact that the company manifested
the basic commercial purpose to profit from the market through a regular course of
sales. Imposing an additional conduct requirement unduly protects indirect shippers
and manufacturers from the exercise of personal jurisdiction of the forum state in which
they have profited. '^^
'^^ See Id
See supra p. 11
.
'^^ See Erik T. Moe, Asahi Metal Industry Co. v. Superior Court: The Stream of
Doctrine, Barely Alive but still Kicking Asahi Metal Industry Co. v. Superior, 76 Geo.
L.J. 203,223(1987).
"Moreover, Justice O'Connor's restrictive view of the stream of
commerce may give foreign manufacturers a competitive edge over their
American counterparts. American manufacturers must include in the cost
of goods expenses associated with potential products liability litigation.
An additional contacts requirement removes from domestic court
jurisdiction foreign manufacturers whose only contacts are indirect forum
sales. Foreign manufacturers, thus freed from litigation expenses, would
benefit from lower costs. As a result, foreign producers could potentially
enjoy a competitive advantage over United States manufacturers in both
the domestic and international marketplace. Given that jurisdiction is
proper over manufacturers who benefit from forum sales, due process
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Further, her opinion fails to comport with the realities of international
commerce. It is not usual that foreign component parts manufacturers, whose products
are incorporated into final products by the foreign final product manufacturers and sold
in the United States, engage in the additional conducts noted by Justice O'Connor in
Asahi. All of these activities are usually undertaken by final product manufacturers or
replacement parts manufacturers.^^'' Under Justice O'Connor's opinion, most of foreign
component part manufacturers would not be subject to the jurisdiction of the courts in
the United States, even if a large amount of their products are continuously incorporated
into final products and are continuously sold in the United States over many years and
despite knowledge that their products will reach the United States.'^*
The purpose of the Due Process Clause is to provide a defendant with
reasonable predictability whether its activities will cause it to be subject to litigation in
principles should not be twisted to grant foreign manufacturers greater
forum benefits by exempting them from jurisdiction.
" See Howard B. Stravitz, Sayonara to Minimum Contacts: Asahi Metal Industry Co.
V. Superior Court, 39 S.C.L.Rev. 729, 790 (1988).
"Although "designing," "advertising," "advising," or "marketing" with
specific reference to the forum state tends to establish intent to serve that
market, there are activities that almost invariably would be undertaken by
manufacturers of final consumer products or of replacement parts. It
would be highly unusual for a nonreplacement component part
manufacturer to engage in these types of consumer oriented activities.
This is especially so with respect to a component part that is attached to,
and not readily separable from, the final consumer product such as the
valve stem of a tire tube. A literal reading of the O'Connor plurality
suggests that a foreign component part manufacturer could not be sued in
a jurisdiction in which its product was systematically and continuously
distributed with its knowledge and acquiescence over many years so long
as the manufacturer did not engage in consumer oriented activity in the
forum state."
138 See Id.
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the forum state, thereby permitting it to take steps to alleviate the risk of litigation by
procunng insurance, etc.'''^ When a foreign corporation is aware of the destination of
its products, it can reasonably assume that it could cause injuries in the destination
state, and consequently it is given clear notice that it might be sued in the forum state
for claims relating to the sale of its products. Therefore, it is not unreasonable to
subject the foreign corporation to the suit in the forum state. Justice O'Connor
distinguished between the defendant's mere awareness of the destination of its product
and its purposeful availment of the forum. For the purpose of notice. Justice
O'Connor's additional conduct requirement is not necessarily for manufacturers who
already have notice that they may be subject to litigation in the forum because they
knew that their products are sold in the forum state.
4. New Approach for the Stream of Commerce
A foreign defendant should be subject to the forum state's personal jurisdiction
if it places its products in the stream of commerce with the expectation that these
products will reach the forum state and the products cause damage to residents in the
forum state. In products liability actions, the balance should be weighed for the
protection of consumers. In some cases, it is possible that a foreign defendant may not
actually know that its products are sold in some distant forum. Proof of defendants
knowledge will be difficult because all the material information is in the hands of a
distant defendant. However, the determination that the defendant was not aware of the
final destination of its products would deprive the resident of the United States of the
right to sue foreign corporations and recover for damages in products liability cases in
the United States. When a manufacturer directly or indirectly makes regular sales in a
forum state and enjoys the benefit from the sale of its products in the forum state, it is
139
See supra note 34.
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not unreasonable that the manufacturer be subject to the jurisdiction of the forum state.
When the product has been sold regularly in the state, a defendant should not be
permitted to use its ignorance of its commercial activities as a shield to avoid
jurisdiction. Even under this approach, the due process principle will protect the
defendant from jurisdiction arising out of an unknown, isolated or fortuitous sale, since
the random conduct does not constitute purposeful availment.
Therefore, once a foreign company places its product in the stream of
commerce, and the product reaches the forum state through the normal course of
commercial distribution and causes injuries to a forum state's resident, the foreign
company should be subject to the jurisdiction of the forum state.
Chapter IV. Application of Asahi
This chapter examines how American courts have applied Asahi to foreign
manufacturers in products liability cases for the purpose of international jurisdiction.
A. Component Parts Manufacturers
The defendant in the third party indemnification claim in Asahi was the
manufacturer of the tire valve assembly. Its products were imported into the United
States only after being incorporated into the finished tire in Taiwan. Component parts
manufacturers like this are one step removed from U.S. consumers and the forum state
than are finished product manufacturers or the national distributors who are engaged in
the marketing or sales of their products in the United States. When component parts are
incorporated into the finished products outside of the forum state, the contacts of the
component parts manufacturer with the forum state are relatively limited. Therefore,
most of the lower courts after Asahi have found that minimum contacts between forum
state and component parts manufacturers do not exist unless those manufacturers have
more extensive contacts with the forum state.
I AC)
1. Felix V. Bontoro Kommanditgesellschaft
For example, in Felix, the Court of Appeals of California denied the exercise of
jurisdiction of California over a German component parts manufacturer whose products
were incorporated into the finished products in Germany.
140 196 Cal. App. 3d 106 (Ct. App. 1988).
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The administrator of the deceased, who was killed in an automobile accident in
California in 1982, brought a products liability action, inter alia, against Bomoro
Kommanditgesellschaft (Bomoro), a German automobile door latch assembly
manufacturer. The suit alleged a defect in the design of the door latch assembly which
caused the decedent to be thrown from the vehicle during the accident.''*' Bomoro
moved to quash service on the ground it lacked the requisite minimum contacts with
California.''*"^
The vehicle in which the deceased was riding at the time of the accident was
manufactured in West Germany in 1965 by Volkswagen and was known in the industry
as a model Type III.''*^ Bomoro supplied its automobile door latch assemblies to
Volkswagen as a component part of the Type III. ''*'* When Bomoro started the sales of
the door latch assemblies to Volkswagen, Bomoro was informed by Volkswagen that all
vehicles were to be marketed and sold in Europe and not in the United States.''*^
Although Volkswagen of America (VWOA) did not commence importing Type III
vehicles from Germany to the United States until the 1966 model year, an undetermined
number of newly manufactured 1965 automobiles were purchased in Europe by
unauthorized dealers and others and shipped to the United States.
'^'&e/^. at 108-09.
"^5eeMatl09.
'''See Id.
''""Seeld.
''*^ See Id. Bomoro insisted that it "did not know and could not reasonably have
expected or anticipated that its products assembled by Volkswagen mto the Model Type
ni ... would find their way to California." Id.
^'^ See Id. at 110. The court also found that beginning in late 1965, VWOA imported
and sold in excess of 4,723 1966 model year Type 111 vehicle to authorized distributors
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Regarding the foreseeability of the destination of the component parts, the
Cahfomia Court of Appeals noted that, "[i]n today's rapidly shrinking commercial
world with its increasing emphasis on integrated and interdependent goods, it is of
course possible for a foreign manufacturer of component parts to reasonably expect that
the stream of distribution will carry its products into each of the 50 states and, indeed,
around the world."''*^ However, the court went on to state that this kind of expectation
that its product might reach the forum state was not enough to satisfy the minimum
contacts requirement for the exercise of personal jurisdiction. The court stated that
"[ijndividuals and corporations alike must be given fair notice about which activities
will make them amenable to suit in a forum state. "'"^^
After acknowledging the list of Justice O'Connor's additional conducts in Asahi
as examples of the plaintiffs activities which would satisfy the minimum contacts
requirement, the court required defendant's activities purposefully directed toward the
forum state for the exercise of jurisdiction.'^*^ The court stated that "a foreign
corporation must knowingly avail itself of the benefits accruing from its activities
within the forum before jurisdiction will attach."'^' The court further stated that "[t]he
appropriate test is not knowledge or awareness of the ultimate destination of the
who in turn sold their inventory to authorized dealerships doing business throughout the
United States. Id.
'^^/c/. at 114-15.
''' See Id.
'^^M at 115.
150 See Id ai lie.
''' Id
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product, but whether the manufacturer has purposefully engaged in forum activities so it
can reasonably expect to be haled into court there. "'^' Based on this standard, the court
denied the exercise ofjurisdiction of California on the ground that the sole contact that
Bomoro had with California was that Volkswagen sold automobiles in California which
contained the door latches manufactured by Bomoro in Germany. '^^ The court based its
decision on the facts that all of the sales and distribution of the finished products were
conducted by Volkswagen, and Bomoro was not involved in the sale or distribution of
them.'^"* Then the court concluded that "[t]he contacts in this case are simply too
fortuitous and tenuous to warrant the exercise of personal jurisdiction."'^^
2. Wilson V. Kuwahara Co. '^^
In the same way, in Wilson, a Federal District Court in Michigan denied the
exercise ofjurisdiction over a Japanese wheel assembly manufacturer. In this case, the
widow of a bicyclist killed in an accident brought a products liability action, inter alia,
against Kuwahara Co. (Kuwahara), a Japanese bicycle manufacturer, and Yanagihara
Kogyo Co. (Yanagihara), a Japanese wheel assembly manufacturer, alleging that the
accident was caused by a defect in the bicycle wheel assembly.'^'' Kuwahara then filed
'" Id.
^^^ See Id.
'^'
See Id.
''' Id
'^^ 717 F. Supp. 525 (W.D.Mich. 1989).
^^^ See Id
'" See Id. at 526.
42
cross-claim seeking indemnification against Yanagihara, and Yanagihara filed a motion
to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction.'^^
Yanagihara' s wheel assembly at issue was sold to a Japanese distributor in
Japan, and the distributor in turn sold the wheel assembly to Kuwahara. Then,
Kuwahara incorporated the wheel assembly into its bicycle in Japan. '^^
To justify the exercise of jurisdiction over Yanagihara, Kuwahara contended
that Yanagihara was aware that Yanagihara' s parts might be distributed in the United
States after incorporated into the final products. '^^ However, the District Court rejected
Kuwahara' s contention, stating that the mere awareness of the destination of the
products was not enough to satisfy the minimum contacts requirement. In denying the
exercise of jurisdiction over Yanagihara on the ground that Yanagihara had not
purposefully availed itself of the privilege of conducting activities in Michigan, the
court concluded that "Yanagihara's only significant Michigan connection is through the
sale of a wheel in Japan to another Japanese company, who then sold the wheel in
Japan to a third Japanese company, who then transferred the wheel to this country,
where it found its way to Michigan."
Felix and Wilson are quite similar to Asahi in that the component parts were
incorporated into the finished products in foreign countries and were not specifically
manufactured or designed for the use of U.S. consumers. Further these defendant had
^^"^Seeld.^XSll.
^^'^ See Id. ^X 526-51.
^^^ See Id ax 529.
^^^ See Id ax 532.
''' Id
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not engaged in any activities related to the sale of their products in the forum state.
Hence, it is not surprising that after ^Aa/z/, jurisdiction was found lacking in these cases.
3. Falkirk Mining Co. v. Japan Steel Works, LtcL^^^
Thus, in cases where foreign component parts were sold and incorporated in the
finished products in foreign countries, the courts have usually found that mmimum
contacts with the forum state were lacking. However, in Falkirk Mining, the Eighth
Circuit found minimum contacts were not present even where the component products
were incorporated into the finished products in the forum state and the component
products were specifically manufactured or designed for use by customers m the United
States. Although this was not a products liability action, this case shows the impact of
Asahi in the lower courts.
In Falkirk Mining, Falkirk's parent corporation entered into a contract with
Marion Power Shovel (Marion), whose principle place of business was in Ohio, for the
purchase and construction of a walking dragline crane (dragline) to be used in strip
mining coal. Marion then agreed to purchase six eccentric cams for incorporation into
draglines from Mitsui & Co. Inc. (Mitsui U.S.A.), the American subsidiary of Mitsui &
Co., Ltd (Mitsui). Mitsui then contracted with Japan Steel Works Ltd. (Japan Steel
Works), a Japanese steel equipment manufacturer, to manufacture the six cams. Japan
Steel Works made two cams following the specification and drawings of Marion for use
in the construction of the draglines.'^ One of the eccentric cams was delivered from
Japan Steel Works to Mitsui in Japan. '^^ Mitsui or Mitsui U.S.A. then transferred the
163 906 F.2d 369 (8th Cir. 1990).
^^^ See Id. at 371. The court found that officials of Marion "monitored Japan Steel's
manufacturing process in Japan to insure compliance with contract specifications and
timeliness requirements." Id.
'^^ See Id.
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cam to Kobe, Japan, and delivered it to Marion. Marion's agent shipped the cam to
North Dakota. Marion then incorporated the cam in the dragline at the site of Falkirk in
North Dakota.'^ After the cam was installed in the dragline, the cam cracked. Falkirk
filed an action to recover damages against Japan Steel Works alleging the breach of
implied and express warranties, negligence and strict liability. Japan Steel Works
moved to dismiss on the grounds that the district court lacked personal jurisdiction. '^*
The Eighth Circuit ruled that there was no jurisdiction over Japan Steel Works
because Japan Steel Works did not purposefully direct its activities toward North
Dakota. '^^ The court found that "aside from one isolated, unrelated visit by Japan Steel
engineers to North Dakota to install plastic injection machines at a 3M plant, neither
Japan Steel nor Japan Steel Works America (an American subsidiar>' of Japan Steel
Works) has purposefully availed itself of the laws and protections of the State of North
Dakota."'^^
Falkirk contended that the fact that the cam was incorporated into the dragline at
the Falkirk Mine in North Dakota was sufficient to subject Japan Steel Works to
personal junsdiction of North Dakota. '^^ However, the court did not think the place
where the cam was installed should be the determinative factor in the minimum
contacts examination. The court stressed that Japan Steel Works entered into a contract
with Mitsui or Mitsui U.S.A. and delivered the completed product to Mitsui in Japan.
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Seeld.dX2>l\-12.
'^^ See Id. at 372.
^^^ See Id.
^'''^ See Jd. at 375-76.
^^"^ Id ax 375.
^^^ See Id
45
The court further noted that Japan Steel Works manufactured the cam in accordance
with specifications provided by Marion, not by Falkirk, and there was no evidence that
Japan Steel Works knew the ultimate destination of the cam. "
Thus, Japan Steel Works did nothing more than place its products in the stream
of commerce outside the United States. Referring to the Supreme Court decision in
Asahi, the court held that "the placement of the products into the stream of commerce,
without more, does not constitute an act of the defendant purposefully directed toward
the forum state." '^^
Thus, in cases of foreign component parts manufacturers which do not engage in
an additional contact, the courts after Asahi have found minimum contacts absent, even
if the manufacturers placed their products into the stream of commerce with knowledge
that they would ultimately reach the United States.
4. Showa Denko K.K. v. Pangle^^"^
On the other hand, when the component parts manufacturer has engaged in
purposeful activities in the forum state, lower courts have found a sufficient basis for
the exercise of jurisdiction. For example, in Showa Denko, the Court of Appeals of
Georgia found sufficient minimum contacts between a Japanese drug materials
manufacturer and State of Georgia where the Japanese drug materials manufacturer
purposefully engaged in nationwide marketing activities in the United States through its
subsidiary in New York.
^^^ See Id.
^'^^
Id. dA 376.
174 202 Ga.App. 245(1991).
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Juanita Pangle, a Georgia resident, was severely injured when she contracted
eosinophilia myalgia syndrome allegedly as a result of ingesting L- tryptophan, an
ammo acid used as a dietary supplement. The amino acid was produced in Japan by
Showa Denko K.K. (Showa Denko). Although Showa Denko had not directly
committed any act in Georgia related to L- tryptophan for human consumption, its New
York subsidiary, Showa Denko America, Inc. (SDA), marketed and distributed Showa
Denko's raw materials to twenty-three pharmaceutical manufacturers in nine states,
including Flonda and South Carolina. "^^ The raw materials were then incorporated into
diet supplement pills by American manufacturers and sold throughout the nation.
Showa Denko moved to dismiss Pangles's action filed against it in Georgia on the
1 78
ground that personal jurisdiction was lacking.
The Court of Appeals of Georgia found sufficient minimum contacts between
Showa Denko and the State of Georgia because "Showa Denko should have reasonably
anticipated being haled into court in Georgia."' ''^ The Georgia court chose to apply the
traditional stream of commerce analysis set forth by the United States Supreme Court in
175
See Id. at 245.
'^^ See Id. at 246-47. The court found that SDA sold approximately $4,000,000 worth
of L- tryptophan in the United States during 1989.
'^^ See Id. These manufacturers included "nationally marketed brands such as Nature's
Bounty as well as General Nutrition Products, Inc., and Walgreen Laboratories, Inc.,
which operated retail stores throughout the country." Id.
178 See Id. at 245.
'^^
Id. at 250. The court noted that even under the rational set forth in Asahi, Showa
Denko's act established the necessary minimum contacts with Georgia. See Id. at 245.
The court stated that; "The record in this case shows S.D.A.'s contact with Nature's
Bounty required SDA. to comply with the laws of all states and the United States.
Thus, Showa Denko, through its agent, agreed to produce the product so that it would
be marketable in all states, including Georgia." Id.
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World-Wide Volkswagen, reasoning that the "splintered view of minimum contacts in
Asahi provides no clear guidance on this issue."'^^
The court held that "[w]ether the introduction of a product into the stream of
commerce establishes minimum contacts with a state in which the product is ultimately
sold depends on the foreseeability that the product would be sold there. "'^' Unlike
World-Wide Volkswagen where the defendant's product reached forum state by
plaintiffs unilateral activities, in this case, "it is not happenstance that the product was
ultimately consumed in Georgia."'^^ The court found that "[p]laintifrs purchase and
use of defendant's product in Georgia was a result of defendant's deliberate and
purposeful nationwide distribution of its product." Hence, when "a foreign
manufacturer sells its product to a United States distributor knowing that its product
will be sold in every state, it should reasonably expect to be haled into court in Georgia
for an injury caused in this state by that product."'^
In upholding jurisdiction, the court distinguished the case from Asahi where the
foreign component parts manufacturer sold its products to another foreign country's
finished products manufacturer.'^^ Here, Showa Denko shipped its products into the
'*°
Id. In this point, the court referred to Irving v. Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp., 864
F.2d 383, 386 (5th Cir. 1989) where similarly the Fifth Circuit found that it was not
bound by Asahi to reject the World-Wide Volkswagen stream ofcommerce analysis
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Id. at 247-48.
'^^ Id at 248.
'''
Id.
184 Id
185
See Id.
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United States through its American subsidiary which acted as its agent for selhng the
products to manufacturers throughout the nation.
^^
5. Haedike v. Kodiak Research, Ltd '^^
In the same way, in Haedike, a United States District Court in Illinois found
constitutionally sufficient minimum contacts between the State of Illinois and a German
component parts manufacturer. Fritz Hintermayer, GmbH, Bing-Vergaser-Fabrik (Bing)
is a German corporation manufacturing carburetors to be incorporated into Rotax
engine packs Bombardier-Rotax, GmbH (Rotax) is an Austrian company
manufacturing engine packs for aviation use. Bing's carburetor at issue was
incorporated into a Rotax engine pack in Austria by Rotax. '^^ Then, through Rotax's
Canadian distributor, the Rotax engine pack at issue in this case was sold to an aircraft
manufacturer in Florida for installation in an aircraft.
'^^
Because of the defect in the
carburetor, the aircraft crashed, and plaintiff Haedike was injured in Illinois. Haedike
filed a products liabilit>' action against Rotax and Bing, and Bing challenged the court's
jurisdiction over it.
The United States District Court found sufficient minimum contacts to support
the exercise of Illinois' jurisdiction over Bing. The court acknowledged the validity of
the stream of commerce theory, '^^ holding that the critical element in the examination
'^^ See Id. at 250.
'^^ 814 F. Supp. 679 (N.D.Ill. 1992).
^^^ See Id. at 680.
"'^See /J. at 680-81.
^^5ee/^. at 683-84.
49
of minimum contacts was whether the defendants purposefully availed themselves of
the privilege of conducting activities within Illinois. '^^
Here, the court noted that "Bing placed its products, including the allegedly
defective carburetor incorporated into Haedike's aircraft, into "the stream of
commerce" with the expectation that they would be purchased by consumers in
Illinois."^^' Thus, under the stream of commerce theory, the Illinois court could exert
its jurisdiction over Bing. Moreover, the court further found that Bing maintained an
extensive business relationship with the United States. For example, Bing had entered
into an agency agreement with a Nebraska distributor granting it the ''sole sales right"
of Bing carburetors, Bing had sold its carburetors directly to United States companies,
every BMW motorcycle sold in the United States was equipped with a Bing carburetor,
and a large number of Bing's carburetors had been sold in Illinois. '^^ Thus, in light of
all these contacts with the United States the court concluded that "Bing should have
reasonably foreseen being subject to the jurisdiction of an Illinois court."
Bing not only supplied its component parts to Rotax in Austria for use in the
engines manufactured by Rotax, it also exploited Illinois' market itself through
aggressive marketing and sales efforts. The nature of its ties to the forum were much
different from that of the component parts product manufacturer in Asahi. The court
noted that "Bmg's status as a foreign corporation pales in comparison to its aggressive
economic strategy which included the development and supply of an Illinois market."
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6. Analysis
In Asahi, the claim of the forum resident had already settled and the only
remaining claim was a third-party indemnification claim between the Taiwanese
corporation and the Japanese corporation. The interest of the forum in adjudicating the
dispute was reduced by the settlement of the claim of the California resident.
Therefore, in Asahi, the limitations placed on the exercise of the forum state's judicial
power were understandable. However, lower courts after Asahi have been reluctant to
uphold jurisdiction over foreign component part manufacturers even in claims brought
by forum residents to recover for their injuries. In Wilson and Falkirk, the court denied
the exercise of jurisdiction even though the forum resident or corporation was
attempting to sue the foreign component parts manufacturer directly. In Felix, the
foreign component parts manufacturer was involved in the case by the original
defendant's indemnification claim; however, the claim of the original plaintiff had not
settled. In these cases, the courts had a strong interest to provide a proper forum for
resident plaintiffs and to solve all claims in the same court. However, the courts did not
distinguished the case from Asahi on this basis, and denied the exercise ofjurisdiction.
Thus, in the lower courts after Asahi, concerns about the lack of minimum contacts
owing to the application of the stream of commerce theory have not usually been
overcome by arguments about the reasonableness of the assertion ofjurisdiction.
B. Justice O'Connor's Approach
The distinction between the component parts manufacturer and finished product
manufacturer is not the sole basis for determining the amenability of the foreign
company to suit in the United States. Some lower courts, following Justice O'Connor's
stream of commerce p/w^ additional conduct approach in Asahi, look for the four factors
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described by Justice O'Connor'^^ as the threshold of the minimum contacts
determination. However, what kind of conduct will satisfy the requirement of
additional contacts to constitute a jurisdictionally sufficient nexus very much depends
on the concrete facts of each case. This section will examine how the courts have
applied Justice O'connoir's additional conduct approach.
1. Dittman v. Code-A-Phone Corp}^^
In Dittman, plaintiff Dittman filed a products liability action against Code-A-
Phone Corporation (Code-A-Phone) to recover damages for an injury caused by a
defective cordless telephone. Code-A-Phone in turn filed a third-party complaint
against Uniden Corporation of Japan (Uniden Japan), a Japanese manufacturer of the
cordless telephone, seeking indemnity for any damages awarded to Dittman. Uniden
Japan contested Indiana's jurisdiction.
A federal District Court in Indiana found sufficient minimum contacts between
Uniden Japan and Indiana for the exercise of personal jurisdiction. Although Code-A-
Phone was an American distributor of Uniden Japan, Uniden Japan itself engaged in
marketing and sales efforts throughout the United States through its subsidiary in
Indianapolis.'^*^ The court emphasized the relationship between Uniden Japan and its
'^^ As examples of such additional conducts. Justice O'Connor named, (1) designing the
product for the market in the forum State, (2) advertising in the forum State, (3)
establishing channels for providing regular advice to customers in the forum State, or
(4) marketing the product through a distributor who has agreed to serve as the sales
agent in the forum State. See supra p. 22.
'^^ 666 F. Supp. 1269 (N.D.Ind. 1987).
'^^5ee/J. at 1270-71.
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American subsidiary and found that those operations were not completely separated. '^^
To clarify the parent-subsidiary relationship of Uniden Japan, the court noted the facts
that the American subsidiary processed the FCC application on behalf of Uniden Japan
and officers of Uniden Japan spend considerable amount of their working time in
Indianapolis. The court concluded that Uniden Japan was a major participant in the
American cordless telephone market and therefore the assertion of personal jurisdiction
over Uniden Japan was appropriate. Thus in Dittman, Uniden Japan's conduct in
directly marketing its products in the U.S. through its American subsidiary satisfied
Justice O'Connor's additional conduct requirement.
2. Benitez-Allende v. Alcan Aluminio Do Brasif^^
In Benitez-Allende, residents of Puerto Rico filed products liability actions in
Puerto Rico against Alcan Aluminio do Brasil, S.A. (Alcan/Brasil), a Brazilian pressure
cooker manufacturer, to recover for injuries suffered because of defective pressure
cookers of Alcan/Brasil. The First Circuit affirmed the exercise of jurisdiction over
Alkan/Brasil. The court found that: (1) Alcan/Brasil hired an American sales
representative and asked him to solicit orders in Puerto Rico to sell its pressure cookers
in the American market, and (2) Alcan/Brasil sold 300,000 pressure cookers to
'^^ See Id. at 1273. The court noted that "jurisdiction is not solely on the parent-
subsidiary relationship, but rather on the way in which this relationship operated in this
case." Id.
'"^ See Id.
^°' See Id. at 1272. The court distinguished the case from Asahi, noting that, "unlike
Asahi, who marketed a component which was integrated into a larger product," Uniden
Japan sold a finished product to Code-A-Phone as one of the marketing efforts of itself
throughout the United States. Id.
202 857F.2d26(lstCir. 1988).
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Americans between 1977 and 1981, 240,000 of which were sold in Puerto Rico.^^''
Based on these facts, the court concluded that the deliberate marketing efforts of
Alkan/Brasil in Puerto Rico were sufficient to satisfy Justice O'Connor's additional
conducts requirement.'^''
3. Vermeulen v. Renault U.S.A., Inc.^^^
In Vermeulen, a Georgia resident brought a products liability action in Georgia
seeking recovery for damages suffered in an automobile accident, against Regie
Nationale Des Usines Renault (RNUR), a French vehicle manufacturer. The Eleventh
Circuit found that RNUR satisfied Justice O'Cormor's additional conduct requirement
in four points.
First, RNUR designed the car for Georgia's market by modifying the vehicles to
accommodate the American market. "^^ Although RNUR had not designed the car
specifically for the Georgia market, the court noted that the fact that RNUR designed its
products for the United States generally as part of a nationwide marketing effort in
order to promote the widest distribution of RNUR's car was sufficient to satisfy this
standard.
'°''
Second, RNUR advertised the car through a nationwide advertising campaign
which reached Georgia. ^^^ Ahhough it was not clear which advertising was specifically
^^^ See Id at 29.
^°'* See Id. at 30.
205 975 p 2(j 746 (1 ith Cir. 1992).
^^^ See Id at 758.
207
See Id.
''' See Id
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directed at Georgia, the court stated that the fact that RNUR's car was nationally
advertised and such advertising reached Georgia was sufficient to establish the
necessary relation between Georgia and RKUR.^°^
Third, RNUR established channels for providing regular advice to their
customers in Georgia through dealerships of their American distributor." '° The court
noted that, according to the dealership agreement between RNUR and its American
dealer, the American dealer must "use its best efforts to assure that Dealers will comply
with all sales and service manuals that Renault may from time to time issue relating to
the sale and servicing of Renault products and other matters covered by [the
Distributor's Agreement] or the Dealer franchises."""
Finally, RNUR created and maintained the distribution network that brought its
car into Georgia.^ '"^ The court found that RNUR agreed with its American distributor to
create a nationwide distribution network over which RNUR retained ultimate control,
and it was actually involved into the distribution network." Because of the totality of
contacts between RNUR and the American market, it is not at all surprising that
jurisdiction over it was upheld. It clearly met the higher standards for jurisdiction set by
Justice O'Connor in Asahi. The importance of this case probably lies in the willingness
of the Eleventh Circuit to allocate national contacts to a particular state when suit is
brought by an injured consumer.
''' See Id.
''' See Id.
'''Id
2'^ See /^. at 759-60.
'''See Id
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4. Tobin v. Astra Pharmaceutical Products, Inc?^^
In Tobin, plaintiff Kathy Tobin was severely injured by the side effects of the
dosage of ritodrine manufactured by Duphar B.V. (Duphar), a Netherlands corporation.
Tobin filed a products liability action against Duphar and Astra Pharmaceutical
Products Inc. (Astra), an American distributor of Duphar' s products, seeking recovery
of damages. Duphar contested jurisdiction alleging that Astra was an independent
distributor and Duphar had simply placed its products into the stream of commerce.
The district court dismissed the action against Duphar on the ground that Duphar had
not engaged in any additional conduct as required by Justice O'Connor in Asahi.
Plaintiff appealed the dismissal of Duphar.
The Sixth Circuit reversed, finding sufficient minimum contacts between
Duphar and State of Kentucky. ^'^ The court held that Duphar's marketing activities in
the United States satisfied Justice O'Connor's additional conduct requirement in
Asahi^^^ Duphar directly submitted a New Drug Application to the FDA for approval
and conducted clinical studies in the United States. The court found that Duphar's
conduct would satisfy Justice O'Connor's requirement of "designing the product for
the market in the forum state."^'^ In addition, Duphar sought and obtained a United
States distributor to exploit the United States market. Thus, the court concluded that
Duphar was "marketing the product through a distributor who has agreed to serve as the
214 993 F.2d 528 (6th Cir. 1993).
^'^5ee7£/. at542.
^•^5ee/c/. at544.
^'^&e /J. at 543.
'''
Id.
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sales agent in the forum State." Based on these findings, the court concluded that
Duphar had not simply placed its product into the stream of commerce. "^^
Responding to Duphar' s contention that it had done nothing particularly in the
Kentucky market as distinguished from any other state, the court stated that "if we were
to accept defendant's argument on this point, a foreign manufacturer could insulate
itself from liability in each of the fifty states simply by using an independent national
distributor to market its products." " The court concluded that "by licensing Astra to
distribute ntodrine in all fifty states it employed the distribution system that brought
ritodrine to Kentucky.
"^^^
Thus, court in Tobin made it clear that when a foreign manufacturer sets up its
marketing system to exploit the American market to sell its products throughout the
United States, the manufacturer can not insulate itself from suit in the forum state solely
because it used an independent distributor to sell its products.
'
5. Soo Line Railroad Co. v. Hawker Siddeley Canada, Inc.'^^
Soo Line Railroad Company (Soo Line) filed a products liability action in
Minnesota against Hawker Siddeley Canada, Incorporated (Hawker Siddeley), a
^^'^Seeld.dXSAA.
''' See Id.
''' Id
^"^ See Id
2" See Id. The court cited Mott v. Schelling and Co., 966 F.2d 1453 (6th Cir. 1992). In
Mott, the Sixth Circuit found the necessary additional conducts where an Austrian
industrial equipment manufacturer actively cultivated the American market in addition
to having an independent distributor for the sale and resale of its products in the United
States.
224 950 F.2d 526 (8th Cir. 1991).
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Canadian manufacturer of railroad cars, to recover damages allegedly caused by a
defective wheel. Hawker Siddeley sold its railcars to a Canadian corporation m
Canada and then the railcar leased to another Canadian corporation. ^^^ The accident
happened in Minnesota while Soo Line was transporting the railcar on its tracks.^'^
Soo Line contended that Hawker Siddeley had significant contact with
Miimesota by virtue of its compliance with standards and requirements established by
the Association of American Railroads (AAR)." In order to receive AAR approval.
Hawker Siddeley had to submit its plans, products, and premises to testing and
inspection. '^^^ Soo Line argued that through designing the product for the discrete
market. Hawker Siddeley could reasonably expect to be haled into court anywhere
within the interchange service market.
However, the Eighth Circuit found minimum contacts between Hawker Siddeley
and State of Minnesota lacking. The court held that "Hawker Siddeley did not design
its railcars for use m Minnesota per se; it designed its railcars for use in most of North
America."^^' The court stated that, even if many of Hawker Siddeley's railcars had
^" See Id. at 528.
^^^ See Id.
^^^ See Id.
^^^ See Id. at 529. All cars used in the interchange service market must comply with
AAR standard. Interchange service refers to the capacity for railcars to be transferred
from one railroad to another. The AAR's standards promote interchange by
establishing requirement relating to both standardization and quality of equipment. The
market covered by the AAR interchange service agreement is almost all railroads in
Mexico, Canada, and the forty-eight contiguous United States. See Id. at 528.
^^^ See Id at 529.
''' See Id.
"' Id. at 530.
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traveled through Minnesota from the actions of a third party, this result alone was not
enough to satisfy the minimum contact requirement.^^'
Thus the Eighth Circuit followed Justice O'Connor's plurality opinion in Asahi,
and required defendant's additional conduct in order to find constitutionally sufficient
minimum contact. Further, the court narrowly interpreted Justice O'Connor's
additional conduct requirement. Under this decision, manufacturing a product to meet
national standards that are applied across the United States does not satisfy Justice
O'Connor's additional conduct requirement for a particular state.
6. Brabeau\.SMBCorp}^^
As the Sixth Circuit showed in Tobin, when foreign manufacturers use
American marketing distributors or sales agents to sell their products systematically,
courts have found sufficient contacts to uphold jurisdiction in states where the products
caused harm. However, in other cases, courts have denied jurisdiction over foreign
manufacturers even if they sold their products to American distributors.
For example, in Brabeau, plaintiff Juania Brabeau, was injured while operating
a printing press at her work place. Brabeau brought a suit in a Michigan state court
against SMB Corporation (SMB), the German printing press manufacturer, to recover
for the injuries suffered due to the defective machine.
The printing press was manufactured by SMB in Braunschweig, Germany,
following the order from Brechteen, an employer of Brabeau, to SMB. All of the
negotiations for the contract, inspection, testing, and acceptance of the machine were
^^^ See Id.
^^^ 789 F. Supp. 873 (E.D.Mich. 1992).
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See Id. at 875.
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made by the personnel of Brechteen in Braunschweig, Germany. The shipment was
made to Michigan following the instruction from Brechteen. The payment was made
directly from Brechteen's parent in Weinheim, Germany, to SMB in Braunschweig.^^^
TTius the actual purchase and transfer of possession of the machine was made in
Germany by the employer of the plaintiff. Brechteen elected to locate the press in
Michigan; it could have located the machine anywhere in the world. SMB had no
control over where Brechteen located the printing press. ""^^
A Federal District Court in Michigan applied Justice O'Connor's approach to
the stream of commerce and held that SMB lacked the additional conducts to support
jurisdiction. In Brabeau, all of the process from the contract to manufacture and sale of
the printing press were done in Germany and SMB had done no activit>' in Michigan.
The court concluded that SMB had not done anything in the State of Michigan which
would satisfy Justice O'Connor's additional conduct requirement. The court
emphasized the fact that SMB had done no business in Michigan except the sale of only
one printing press to Brechteen
238
7. Perry v. Okada Hardware CoP^
In Perry, Hirota Tekko K.K. (Hirota), a Japanese manufacturer of a WECO
maul, sold its mauls to Okada Hardware Company (Okada) in Japan for export to the
^^' See Id.
'''
Id.
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See Id. at 877. Although one of SMB's technicians had visited to Michigan to install
the printing press, however, the court held that this one isolated visit by an SMB
employee did not rise to the level of the minimum contacts. See Id.
^^^ See Id
^-^ 779 P.2d 659 (Utah. 1989).
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United States. Okada exported them to a California distributor,'^'*^ who then sold them
to the regional distnbutor. The regional distributor then sold the mauls to retailers
throughout the west coast and Rocky Mountain area. Linda Thayne bought a WECO
maul from one of the retailers in Idaho. She gave the maul to her father in Utah. Perry
borrowed it from him and was injured in Utah while splitting logs with the maul. Parry
filed a products liability action to recover for his injuries against Hirota and Okada
claiming junsdiction existed tender the stream of commerce theory.
The Supreme Court of Utah rejected the exercise ofjurisdiction over Hirota and
Okada, stating that "an intentional and knowing distribution of the product in the
western United States is not necessarily sufficient to satisfy the "minimum contacts"
requirement."'''" The court found that "Hirota and Okada had not taken active steps to
sell its products in Utah or Idaho,""'*'' and that "Hirota and Okada were informed of
potential sales to the western United States, but they neither came to Utah nor sent sales
representatives to Utah to facilitate the marketing and purchase of their product."
The court held that Hirota and Okada did not have minimum contacts with Utah
because Hirota and Okada had not engaged in even one of the additional acts outlined
^'*" See Id. at 660. The court found that "[California distributor] had submitted
numerous orders to Okada over an extended period of time prior to plaintiffs injury."
Id.
^'*' During the transaction of business, the representative of the California distributor
traveled to Japan and the representative of Okada and Hirota traveled to the United
States to discuss the sale and distribution of their products. On these occasion, Hirota
and Okada were informed from the regional distributor that their maul would be sold in
western United States. See Id.
^^^
Id. at 667
'''
Id.
''' Id
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in Asahi. The court noted that "[i]n this case, the only contact that [the defendant]
has with Utah which is related to the cause of action is the fact that [the defendant's]
product happened to fail and cause damage in the State. "^'*^
In Perry, the attenuation between the manufacturer and the from state was
greater than normal. The product was sold in Idaho to the consumer, and it was moved
to Utah by the consumer's unilateral activities. Thus, the court noted that "[tjhe World-
Wide Volkswagen court made it clear that a seller of chattels does not, in effect, appoint
the chattel his agent for service of process."^'*'' The court concluded that defendant's
knowledge of "the mere possibility that a maul might be taken from Idaho into Utah
would be insufficient to make Hirota and Okuda subject to Utah's, jurisdiction," in the
absence of any of those additional factors cited by Justice O'Connor's opinion.^"*^
8. Analysis
When the defendant is a foreign corporation, the courts that follow Justice
O'Connor's approach treat Justice O'Connor's additional conduct requirement as the
threshold for finding minimum contacts. For example, in Dittman, the Court found
sufficient minimum contacts between the Japanese manufacturer of the cordless
telephones and Indiana on the ground that the Japanese corporation engaged in the
marketing activities in Indiana through its subsidiary in Indianapolis. In Benitez, the
First Circuit affirmed the exercise of Puerto Rico's jurisdiction over a Brazilian
corporation on the ground that it had directly engaged in the marketing and sales
activities for its products in Puerto Rico through its American sales representative. In
^^^ See Id at 660.
^^^ Id at 667.
^^Ud. 5ee 444 U.S. at 296.
^^^ See Id
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Vermeulen, the French defendant had exploited the Georgia market through a
nationwide marketing effort, and distribution channels that it controlled. Similarly, in
Tobin, although the Netherlands corporation used an independent American distributor
to sell its products in the United States, the Sixth Circuit affirmed the exercise of
jurisdiction on the ground that the defendant licensed and controlled the distribution
system that sold its product nationwide.
On the other hand, when the products reached the forum state as a consequence
of sales concluded between companies outside the U.S. as in Brabeau, or where the
foreign manufacturer had sold its products to a U.S. distributor and through a series of
transfer over which it had no control or direction the product had injured someone in
the forum state, the failure to meet the additional conduct requirements outlined by
Justice O'Connor foreclosed jurisdiction. Even though those courts denied the assertion
of jurisdiction on the ground that the defendants lacked the additional conduct set out
by Justice O'Connor in Asahi, these cases could easily reach the same conclusion under
the analysis of World-Wide Volkswagen.
C. Justice Brennan's Approach
By requiring a defendant to have additional conduct beyond selling its product
with awareness that it could by further commercial exchange reach the forum state.
Justice O'Connor limited the scope of personal jurisdiction over defendant
manufacturers. However, even after Asahi, some lower courts have continued to apply
the traditional stream of commerce theory for the exercise ofjurisdiction. These courts
have emphasized the lack of consensus among Justices on the issue of minimum
contacts and have concluded that the Supreme Court in Asahi provided no clear
guidance for the lower courts about the continued efficacy of the stream of commerce
theory.
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1. Mason v. Lli Luigi and Franco Dal Maschio^^'^
The Seventh Circuit has affirmed the validity of the standard stream of
commerce theory despite the Supreme Court's decision in Asahi. For example, in
Mason, the Seventh Circuit applied the stream of commerce theory set out in World-
Wide Volkswagen and affirmed the exercise of jurisdiction of Illinois over an Italian
partnership whose machine caused personal injury to an Illinois resident in Illinois.
The plaintiff, Daraleen Mason, was injured by a broom flagging machine (also
known as a cutter/flagger) manufactured by an Italian partnership Franco Dal Maschio
while she was working for Libman Broom Company (Libman) in Illinois. ' Dal
Maschio sold its cutter/flagger machines to Werner Petzold & Co. (Petzold) in
Maryland, and Petzold in turn sold the machines to Libman.^^' Plaintiff filed her
products liability action against Dal Maschio to recover for damages caused by the
accident. Dal Maschio contended that it would violate the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment to apply the Illinois long-arm statute to it.
The Seventh Circuit distinguished this case from Asahi and held that "Asahi is
of no avail to Dal Maschio's position. "'^^ In Asahi, both of the parties in the third-party
indemnification claim were foreign corporations and the claims of the forum resident
had already settled. In Mason, the plaintiff was a forum resident and plaintiff and the
forum state had a strong interest to pursue the litigation in Illinois."^ Applying the
249 832 F.2d 383 (7th Cir. 1987).
^"^Sfe /J. at 384-85.
^^' See Id. at 385.
252
Id. at 386.
^^^ See Id. The court stated that, "[u]nlike Asahi, this case does not involve an action
for contribution between two foreign corporations."
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stream of commerce theory set out in World-Wide Volkswagen, the court held that Dal
Maschio delivered "its products into the stream of commerce with the expectation that
they will be purchased by consumers in the forum state.
"'^^'^
Dal Maschio was found to have "purposefully availed itself of the privilege of
conducting activities within the forum state." The machine involved in the accident
was designed and manufactured by Dal Maschio especially for use of Libman, and Dal
Maschio sent its employee several times to Libman in Illinois to show how to set up,
operate and service the machines and to teach its personnel. ~^^ In addition, Werner
Petzold, the owner of Petzold, was in fact Dal Maschio 's in-house export manager
rather than an independent distributor, and he sold Dal Maschio 's machinery to Libman
on several occasions.^^^ Thus, Dal Maschio's activities in Illinois satisfied the
purposeful availment requirement. The Italian manufacturer, Dal Maschio, had
designed and manufactured the products especially for the Illinois consumer and had
shipped them to Illinois through its in-house export manager. Even under Justice
O'Connor's narrow approach, the court could find sufficient minimum contacts
between Dal Maschio and State of Illinois.
2. Irving v. Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp,"
In the same way, in Irving, the Fifth Circuit refused to apply Justice O'Connor's
narrow approach to the stream of commerce on the ground that "the [Supreme] Court's
^'Ud.
255
Id. The court quoted World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 297.
^^^ See Id.
^^'^ See Id
^^^ 864 F.2d 383 (5th Cir. 1989).
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splintered view of minimum contacts in Asahi provides no clear guidance on this
issue."'''
In Irving, employees of Uvalde Rock Asphalt Company (Uvalde) in Houston
filed products liability actions against Jugometal Enterprise for Import and Export of
Ores and Metals (Jugometal), a Yugoslavian asbestos distributor, seeking recovery for
injuries arising from the exposure to asbestos at their work places. Yugometal was a
Yugoslavian asbestos distributor and had shipped Yugoslavian asbestos to the Port of
Houston. Jugometal had supplied about 5,000 metric tons of Yugoslavian asbestos to
Uvalde each year from 1956 to 1970 pursuant to a contract with Huxley Development
Company (Huxley), an American broker of Yugoslavian asbestos.'^°
The Fifth Circuit chose to apply the traditional stream of commerce theory as
described in World-Wide Volkswagen and found sufficient minimum contacts between
Jugometal and State of Texas'^' because of Jugometal's important role in the sale of the
asbestos from Yugoslavia to Houston. Jugometal conveyed the asbestos to a freight
forwarder for shipment to Houston, and shared the cost of quality-control testing by a
Houston lab and received Huxley's debits for the bag-cleaning charges of another
Houston company. Jugometal accepted payments for the asbestos and stored
asbestos.'^'"^ These activities satisfied the minimum contacts requirement because they
showed that Jugomrtal received economic benefits from the sale of asbestos and placed
no limitation on the sale of the asbestos.
"'/J. at 386.
2^VSeeM at 384.
2^' See Id at 386.
^^^ See Id
263 See Id. at 387.
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Although Jugometal was not doing business in Texas and was not directly
solicited asbestos sales in Texas,"^'' Jugometal authorized Huxley to drum up American
buyers for Yugoslavian asbestos throughout the United States. Even though the court
did not mentioned it explicitly, Jugometal' s marketing activities in Texas arguably
satisfied Justice O'Connor's additional conduct requirement of the marketing the
product through a distributor who has agreed to serve as the sales agent in the forum
state.
3. Hall V. Zambellf^
In Mali a federal District Court in West Virginia declined to apply Justice
O'Connor's narrow approach to the stream of commerce issue. The plaintiff, a West
Virginia resident, was injured while he was working as a volunteer during a fireworks
display. He was hit in the eye when a fireworks shell exploded prematurely at a low
altitude.^^^ He brought suit in West Virginia against Onda Enterprises, Ltd. (Onda), a
Japanese manufacturer of the allegedly defective fireworks shell.
^^^ Onda challenged
West Virginia's exercise of personal jurisdiction over Onda claiming that it had little or
no contact with the State of West Virginia.^^^ Onda asserted that it sold its products to
^^^ See /J. at 384.
2^^ See Id. at 387.
2^ 699 F. Supp. 753 (S.D.W.Va. 1987).
2^^ See /^. at 753.
^""^ See Id.
2^^ See Id. at 754.
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Zambelli, a Pennsylvania fireworks displayer, in Tokyo, Japan, and Zambelli took the
products to West Virginia for the fireworks display.^''^
After careftil examination of the three different opinions in Asahi, the Hall court
held that the stream of commerce theory maintained precedential value even after Asahi
because Asahi did not give a clear new standard for the stream of commerce owing to
the lack of consensus among Justices. Further the court distinguished the case from
Asahi. Asahi was a manufacturer of a component which was incorporated into the
finished product in a foreign country. Onda, on the other hand, manufactured finished
products for sale to an identified customer in the United States. Asahi was one step
removed from a connection with the United States and the forum state. Then the court
stated that "[t]his was not the traditional stream of commerce case where a
manufacturer attaches a part to a product which ends up in some remote, unanticipated
market."^^^
The Hall court also distinguished World-Wide Volkswagen "where the
[Supreme] Court rejected the notion that the purchaser of a product could by unilateral
action subject the selling defendant to jurisdiction in a foreign forum." In World-
Wide Volkswagen the defendant. New York car dealer, could not profit from the
consumer's travel through Oklahoma. Here, in Hall, both Onda and Zambelli were
commercial entities and the more firework displays performed by Zambelli, the more
^^^ See Id. at 754-55. Onda argued that it had no knowledge of the particular fireworks
display which resulted in the plaintiffs injuries. Id. at 755.
^^' Id at 756.
^^^7^. at 757.
273 Id at 756.
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profits Onda realized. Zambelli's fireworks display in West Virginia, thus, could be
distinguished from the "unilateral activities" in World-Wide Volkswagen.
Based on the relationship between Onda and Zambelli, the Hall court found
sufficient minimum contacts between Onda and West Virginia. The buyer and seller
were both commercial entities and they shared a common interest in the sale of the
products."'''* Onda benefited from the use of its product in West Virginia.^^^ Although
Zambelli was a Pennsylvania resident, Onda knew the scope of Zambelli 's operation.
Onda "should have had every expectation that its products would be used" in West
Virginia. Onda had no direct conducts with West Virginia, and it did not have any
control over Pennsylvania fireworks displayer. Hence, none of the additional conduct
listed by Justise O'Connor appears to have been met, yet.
However, this case, Onda was a finished product manufacturer and it did
directly sell its products to Zambelli, a fireworks displayer. The accident happened
during the fireworks display by Zambelli. Considering Onda's knowledge about the
area of display by Zambelli, the exercise of West Virginia's jurisdiction over Onda is
appropriate. As the Hall court noted, there was no manufacturer or distributor in the
chain of the stream of commerce other than Onda and Zambelli. This case should be
distinguished from the other cases which involve a longer, more attenuated stream of
commerce chain.
^^'^ See Id. at 756. The court stated: "The buyer and seller here are both commercial
entities. One feeds on the other. The more markets Zambelli, the fireworks displayer,
served, the more markets Onda, the fireworks manufacturer, served." Id.
^"^^ See Id.
^''^
See Id. at 757. The court noted that the representative of Onda visited the plant of
the American distributor in Pennsylvania, and Onda could know the scope of the
operation of the American distributor. See Id.
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4. CSR Limited v. MacQueen, III ^^^
CSR Limited (CSR) was a sales agent for its partially owned subsidiary that
mined raw asbestos fibers in Australia." The raw asbestos fibers were sold F.O.B.
Freemantle, Australia, and other ports in Western Australia to Johns Manville
Corporation (Johns Manville), an American manufacturer of asbestos products, which
then distributed the asbestos throughout the United States."''^ CSR contested the
exercise of personal jurisdiction on the ground that it had no knowledge and no control
concerning the use and distribution of the asbestos in the United States.^*^
The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia found sufficient minimum
contacts between CSR and West Virginia based on the traditional stream of commerce
theory. Concerning the Supreme Court decision in Asahi, the court stated that in West
Virginia, courts "always be congruent with the outer edge of the due process envelope
that, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States, circumscribes
jurisdiction.^^' Then the court found that CSR introduced its fibers into the stream of
American commerce knowing that its products would be used in West Virginia. ' To
support its decision, the court further stated that CSR had an ongoing commercial
relationship with the largest American manufacturer of asbestos products, and it was
^^^ 190 W.Va. 695(1994).
^^^ See Id. at 696.
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See Id.
''' See Id
^^'
Id. at 698.
282 See Id. at 697.
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actively engaged in development and introduction of products that contained its raw
material s.'^^"^
In CSR, CSR's sole relationship with West Virginia was that its products
reached West Virginia through an American distributor's nationwide distribution
system. Even though CSR knew that its product would be sold in West Virginia, it had
no other relationship with West Virginia. The court stated that "personal jurisdiction
premised on the placement of a product into the stream of commerce is consistent with
the Due Process Clause' and can be exercised without the need to show additional
conduct by the defendant aimed at the forum state. "^^'*
5. Salinas v. CMMC^^'
In Salinas, The Texas Court of Appeals followed the Fifth Circuit decision in
Irving, and applied the traditional stream of commerce theory to find minimum
contacts. A Hill Country employee, Ambrocio Salinas, suffered injuries due to a
defective wine press manufactured by CMMC, a French wine equipment product
manufacturer. "^^^ Salinas filed a products liability action against CMMC seeking
recovery for his injuries. The wine press was sold by CMMC to KLR Machines, Inc.
(KLR), an American independent distributor of machinery used in the wine and juice
industries.^^^ KLR in turn sold the wine press to Hill Country in Texas.^^^ Other than a
^^^ See Id. a,i69S.
^^ See Id. at 697.
^^^ 903 S.W.2d 138 (Tex. App. 1995).
^^^ 864 F.2d 383 (5th Cir. 1989).
^^^&e903S.W.2d. atl40.
^^^ See Id
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few isolated sales of equipment in the state, CMMC had no other contacts with
290
Texas. CMMC, citing Brabeau, contested the exercise of personal jurisdiction over
it.^^'
The Texas Court of Appeal explicitly adopted Justice Brennan's approach and
found the necessary minimum contacts between the State of Texas and CMMC. The
court reasoned that the Fifth Circuit and the Texas Supreme Court "have embraced
Justice Brennan's position that no additional conduct is required if the defendant is
aware that its product is being marketed in the forum state. "^^'
The court declined to follow Brabeau because the Fifth Circuit and Texas
Supreme Court have taken a different approach than the Sixth Circuit to the stream of
commerce issue. "^^^ Further, the court stressed an important factual difference between
Brabeau and this case. In Brabeau, the actual purchase and transfer of possession of
the machine was made in Germany and the machine was sent to Michigan by the
"^^ See Id. After KLR and Hill Country entered into a contract for the sale of the wine
press, CMMC sent the press to the port of Houston by FOB France, and it was then
transported by truck directly to Hill Country in Cedar Park, Texas. See Id.
^'^ See Id. ax 141.
^^' See Id. at 143. In Brabeau, a worker in a Michigan pnnting company was injured
while using a press manufactured by a German company and sold to the plaintiffs
employer. The court refused to assert personal jurisdiction over the German
manufacturer, reasoning that the defendant had not purposefully availed itself of
Michigan's law. See supra pp. 56-57.
^^^
Id. at 143-44. The Salinas court quoted the Fifth Circuit in Irving v. Owens-Corning
Fiberglas, 864 F.2d 383, 386 (5th Cir. 1989), and the Texas Supreme Court in Keen v.
Ashot Ashke/on, Ltd., 748 S.W.2d 91, 93 (Tex. 1988), decisions in which the traditional
stream of commerce rationale had been employed SifiQiAsahi.
293 5ee903S.W.2dat 143.
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plaintiffs employer." In Salinas, the product was sold to the American customer and
shipped from France to Texas by the French manufacturer.
The court noted that, ifCMMC had sold its product to an entity in another state
who subsequently and unilaterally transported it to Texas, the "stream of commerce
alone [would not] suffice to allow a Texas court to assert jurisdiction."'^^ The mere
placement of the products into the stream of commerce without the knowledge of the
destination of their products is not enough to satisfy the minimum contacts requirement
even under traditional stream of commerce theory. However, in Salinas, CMMC
shipped its wine press directly from France to Texas and the independent distributor
KLR never possessed it.^^^ It was clear that CMMC placed its products into the stream
of commerce with the knowledge that its products would reach Texas.' The Salinas
Court found sufficient minimum contacts stating that "CMMC purposefully availed
itself of the privileges of conducting business in the state of Texas."
Moreover, in Salinas, CMMC modified the product to comport with the
standards that the Texas company requested. ^^^ Hence, the court observed that
''' See Id.
^^^ See Id. at 145. The court noted Smith v. Dainichi Kinzoku Kogyo Co., 680 F. Supp.
847 (W.D.Tex. 1988) in this context. See supra pp. 65-67.
^^^ See Id. at 144. Further, the court distinguished the case from Asahi because, in this
case, CMMC sold a completed press to a known user in Texas. CMMC's contact with
Texas was more direct.
^^\See/c/. atl44.
2^« See Id
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CMMC's modification of the products for the forum market satisfied even Justice
O'Connor's additional conduct requirement in Asahi.
6. Smith V. Dainichi Kinzoku Kogyo Co/'''
Although a Federal District Court in Texas applied Justice Brennan's approach
in Smith, the court denied the exercise of Texas's jurisdiction over the Japanese
manufacturer that placed its products into the stream of commerce. The Texas resident,
Edwin Smith, suffered injuries to his face when an engine lathe was inadvertently
started by a co-worker, causing a metal work-piece to fly from the lathe to Smith's
face/'^" The plaintiff filed this products liability action, against the Japanese
manufacturer, Dainichi Kinzoku Kogyo Co., Ltd. (Dainichi-Japan) alleging a defect in
the design of the lathe. ^^^ Dainichi-Japan moved to dismiss for lack of personal
junsdiction.
The lathe at issue was manufactured by Dainichi-Japan and sold to a Japanese
export company (Gomiyama Japan) in Japan. ^^'^ Gomiyama Japan, then sold the lathe
to their American subsidiary, Gomiyama USA, Inc. (Gomiyama USA), to be imported
into the United States. Gomiyama USA sold the lathe to an American machine tool
retailer. Machinery Sales Co., Inc. (Machinary Sales), which was a California
corporation that had business exclusively in California, Arizona, and Nevada.
^^ See Id.
^^' 680 F. Supp. 847 (W.D.Tex. 1988).
^^^ See Id. ax S49.
'''See Id.
''' See Id
''' See Id.
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Ultimately, Machinery Sales sold the lathe to Martin-Decker, the plaintiffs employer,
in California. Thereafter, Martin-Decker transported the lathe to its machine shop in
Cedar Park, Texas, where plaintiff Edwin Smith was injured.^^^
The Smith court found that Dainichi-Japan was not registered to do business in
Texas, did not have an office, agent, or employee in Texas, and did not sell its products
or conduct any business in Texas. ^^^ The court also found that the lathe in question was
not sold to Smith's employer in Texas, but was sold in California and transported to
inn
Texas by Smith's employer. Under these circumstances, the court held that Dainichi-
Japan should not be subject to jurisdiction because it did not place its lathe into the
stream of commerce with the expectation that it would be purchased by or used by
Texas consumers.
^^^
The court stressed that Dainichi-Japan sold its lathes to a Japanese distributor in
Japan. This distributor transported them to the United States and distributed them to an
independent, regional retail distributor with limited sales areas. ^'^ The lathe in
question was sold by a regional retailer which served only the states of California,
Arizona and Nevada. Dainichi-Japan neither owned nor controlled the distribution of
its products in the United States.
"
Quoting Burger King, the court stated that "a defendant must purposefully avail
himself of the privilege of conducting business in the forum state and without this
'"^ See Id.
^^'' See Id. at S52.
''' See Id
309 See Id.
'''See Id
311 See Id.
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purposeful availment a defendant will not be haled into a jurisdiction solely as a result
of the unilateral activity of another party or a third person." Here, the customer,
Martin-Decker bought the lathe in question in California and later transported it to
Texas. ^''' Thus this lathe came into Texas solely because of the unilateral act of Martin-
Decker. Dainichi-Japan had no part in bringing the lathe to Texas and had no reason to
expect that this lathe would be moved by Martin-Decker to Texas.'"'* Therefore, the
court concluded that this court could not exercise personal jurisdiction over Dainichi-
Japan where the only significant contact that Dainichi-Japan had with Texas was the
result of the unilateral act of third party.
Thus even under the World-Wide Volkswagen approach, when the product is
brought to the forum state by the consumer's unilateral activity, the manufacturer would
not be subject to the forum state's jurisdiction where it had not purposefully availed
itself of the privilege of conducting activities in the forum state.
7. Analysis
Even the courts which purport to take Justice Brennan's approach have sought
to buttress the result by finding additional conduct by the defendant within the forum
state to support their decisions. For example, the Seventh Circuit in Mason affirmed the
exercise of jurisdiction when the foreign defendant placed its products into the stream
of commerce with the knowledge that its products would reach the forum state and
design the equipment to the specific customer's specifications and sold the product to
the customer though its own in-house exporter.
^^^
/J. at 853.
^^^ See Id.
'''See Id
315 See Id.
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In Smith, a Federal District Court in Texas found sufficient minimum contacts
lacking where the Japanese manufacturer had sold its equipment for import to the
United States but had not controlled or directed its resale and shipment to the state
where it caused an injury. In Smith, plaintiffs employer moved the allegedly defective
equipment to Texas after he bought it in California. This case was analogous to World-
Wide Volkswagen in that someone other than the defendant caused the equipment to be
moved to the forum state. Even under Justice Brennan's approach, such unanticipated
and undirected acts of others can exceed the stream of commerce's limits.
In Hall, a Federal District Court in West Virginia found sufficient minimum
contacts between the Japanese fireworks manufacturer and West Virginia, although the
Japanese defendant had not had any direct contact with West Virginia. However, in this
case, the accident was caused by the activities of a fireworks displayer, and the
Japanese manufacturer knew the scope of displayer' s business. As the court noted, this
case should be distinguished from other cases which simply rely on the stream of
commerce because there were no intermediate entities in the chain of the stream of
commerce. The Japanese fireworks manufacture sold its goods to the Pennsylvania
fireworks displayer and benefited economically from its use of the fireworks in what
ever states it put on its fireworks displays.
In Irving and Salinas, the foreign distributors shipped their products directly to
the forum state's consumer or distributor. These defendants knew clearly the
destination of their products and they profited from the sale of their products in the
forum state. Although the courts in these cases found sufficient minimum contacts on
the ground that the foreign manufacturers placed their products in the stream of
commerce, these manufacturers had established direct contact with the forum state
through the sales of their products.
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D. The Impact of Asahi on Domestic Manufacturers
In Asahi, the defendant in the third-party indemnification claim was a foreign
corporation and the Supreme Court stressed repeatedly its awareness of the special
burdens placed on a defendant forced to litigate at great distance in a foreign country's
legal system. The Supreme Court in Asahi did not make it clear whether the limitations
on the stream ofcommerce theory should be applied in the same way to domestic cases.
Even when American manufacturers have been sued, however, many lower courts after
Asahi have declined to use the stream of commerce theory on the ground that the
Supreme Court in Asahi restricted the application of the theory.
1. Boit v. Gar-Tec Products, Inc.^^^
For example, in Boit, when a contractor, Babson, used an electric hot air gun to
strip paint from the exterior calpboards of the Boits' home in Hill, Maine, heat from the
hot air gun penetrated the exterior wall of their home and ignited materials inside the
wall, causing a fire that seriously damaged the home and belongings.'"'^ Boit filed a
products liability complaint against Gar-Tec Products, Inc. (Gar-Tec), an Indiana
corporation which challenged jurisdiction of the court in Maine over it
Boit alleged that Gar-Tec sold the hot air gun at issue to Brookstone, and
Brookstone in turn sold the gun to the paint contractor by mail. Boit argued that
^'^967F.2d. 671(lstCir. 1992).
^^'^ See Id. ax 673.
^'^ See Id. at 674. Babson testified that after receiving a Brookstone catalog in his home
in Maine, he placed a written order with Brookstone for the hot air gun that is the
subject of the Boits' complaint. Brookstone subsequently shipped the hot air gun to
Babson through the mail. Bobson also testified that the hot air gun was labelled "Gar-
Tec" and that the box in which the gun was shipped contained an operator's manual
that bore the word "Gar-Tec" in one-inch high letters. See Id.
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when the hot air gun used on his home was sold by Gar-Tec to Brookstone, a national
retailer with a national mail order business, Gar-Tec should have foreseen that the hot
air gun could end up being sold to a customer in Maine, and that for this reason Gar-Tec
should have reasonably anticipated being haled into court in Maine.^'^ On the other
hand, Gar-Tec argued that it was an Indiana corporation with its principal place of
business in Indiana and it had never conducted or transacted any business in Maine, had
never advertised in Maine, had never employed any persons in Maine, and had never
owned any real estate or other property in Maine.
The First Circuit upheld the district court's dismissal of plaintiffs complaint on
the ground that Boit failed to make a prima facie showing that Gar-Tec sold the hot air
gun to Brookstone. ^^' However, the court further stated that even if Boit could establish
that Gar-Tec sold the hot air gun to Brookstone and that Gar-Tec knew the hot air gun
would be sold by Brookstone to a customer in Maine, the court still could not find a
sufficient basis to exert personal jurisdiction over Gar-Tec. ~
Responding to Boit's contention that Gar-Tec placed its products into the stream
of commerce with the expectation that it would reach Maine, the court stated that "[t]he
test is not knowledge of the ultimate destination of the product, but whether the
manufacturer has purposefully engaged in forum activities so that it can reasonably
expect to be haled into court there. "^^^ To support its decision, the court noted that the
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See Id. sii 679.
^^^ See Id. 673-74.
^^' See Id. at 681. Boit did not submitted any evidence which showed that Gar-Tec sold
hot air gun to Brookstone.
^^^ See Id
^^^
Id. at 682.
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circuit courts that addressed the stream of commerce issue after Asahi have adopted
Justice O'Connor's plurality view.^""* Then the court stated that the only contact that
Gar-Tec had with Maine was Gar-Tec's alleged act of selling the hot air gun to
Brookstone which sold the gun through the mail to Babson in Maine. There was no
evidence that Gar-Tec intended to serve the market in Maine. Therefore, the court
concluded that "the district court could not have constitutionally exercised personal
jurisdiction over Gar-Tec. "^^^
2. Dehmlow v. Austin Fireworks^^^
Contrary, in Dehmlow, the Seventh Circuit followed traditional stream of
commerce theory while Illinois resident sued Kansas manufacturer. In Dehmlow, Craig
Dehmlow, an Illinois resident, was seriously injured in Barrington, Illinois, when
fireworks sold by defendant Austin Fireworks (Austin) improperly exploded.^''' Austin
was a Kansas fireworks manufacturer and distributed the fireworks to a Wisconsin
corporation for the purpose of displaying the fireworks in Illinois and other Midwestern
states.
^^*
The Seventh Circuit first examined the fairness and reasonableness factors in the
due process analysis and held that the exercise of Illinois' personal jurisdiction over the
defendant was fair and reasonable. ^"^ The court found that the burden on the defendant
^^^ See Id. at 683. See Madara v. Hall, 916 F.2d 1510, 1516-17 (11th Cir. 1990);
Falkirk Mining Co. v. Japan Steel Works, Ltd, 906 F.2d 369, 375-76 (8th Cir. 1990).
^" Mat 683.
^^^ 963 F.2d 941 (7th Cir. 1992).
^^^5ee/J. at943.
328 See Id.
^^^ See Id. at 945-46.
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was not unreasonably heaw. The court stated that, unlike Asahi, the exercise of
Illinois' jurisdiction here "does not extend beyond national boundaries and the
defendant does not have to defend itself in a foreign nation's judicial system.""° Then,
the court found both Dehmlow and the state had a strong interest in adjudicating the
case in Illinois. Dehmlow was a citizen of Illinois and injured there. The State of
Illinois had a strong interest in applying its products liability law to assure adequate
remedial relief for its citizen. Further the "interstate judicial system's interest in
resolving the case efficiently" was served by adjudicating the claim in Illinois where the
accident occurred.
The court next examined the minimum contacts between the defendant and the
State of Illinois. The court first noted that it had previously endorsed the stream of
commerce theory. ^^^ The court expressed its intention to maintain the stream of
commerce theory, even though the plurality opinion of the Supreme Court in Asahi
required defendant's additional conduct. The court stated that, even after Asahi, the
theory was determinative in the minimum contacts analysis, because "the Supreme
Court established the stream of commerce theory, and a majority of the Court has not
yet rejected [the theory].
""''
"° Mat 945.
^^^ See Id.
^^^ See Id.
^^^ As the case which recognized the stream of commerce theory, the court cited Mason
V. /.// Luigi & Franco Dal Maschio, 832 F.2d 383, 386 (7th Cir. 1987). See supra pp.
60-62.
"'^ 963 F.2d at 947. The court further noted that "[w]e may not depart from Court
precedent on the basis of a belief that present Supreme Court Justices would not readily
agree with past Court decisions." Id.
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Then the court found the defendant sold fireworks to its customer with the
knowledge that its products would reach Illinois. Thus the Seventh Circuit resolved the
case based on the traditional stream of commerce theory. However, considering the
split opinions in Asahi on this issue, the court further examined defendant's additional
conduct following Justice O'Connor's plurahty opinion in Asahi. The court found
Austin had the additional conducts required by Justice O'Connor's plurality opinion
because Austin knew that its fireworks would be used in Illinois, and Austin actively
solicited business in Illinois."^
3. Ruston Gas Turbines, Inc., v. Donaldson Co., Inc.^^^
In the same way, in Ruston, the Fifth Circuit followed the traditional stream of
commerce theory in a domestic setting. Ruston Gus Turbines, Inc. (Ruston), a Texas
corporation and a buyer of gus turbine engine systems, originally filed an action in
Texas against Donaldson Company, Inc. (Donaldson), a Delaware corporation with its
principal place of business in Minnesota, for breach of contract, breach of warranty, and
stnct products liability.^^^ Donaldson then filed a third-party complaint for contribution
or indemnity against Corchran, Inc. (Corchran), a Minnesota corporation that had
subcontracted with Donaldson to manufacture certain component parts of the systems
sold by Donaldson to Ruston.'^^^ Corchran filed a motion to dismiss the third-party
^^^ See Id. at 947AS.
^^^9F.2d415(5stCir. 1993).
"^ See /^. at 417.
"^ See Id.
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claim for lack of personal jurisdiction on the ground that it had no direct contact with
Texas"^
Regarding the minimum contact between Corchran and Texas, the Fifth Circuit
clearly chose to follow the stream of commerce analysis in World-Wide Volkswagen
and not rely on the plurality opinion in Asahu^^ Referring to the decision in Irving^"^^
the court stated that the Fifth Circuit had continued to follow the traditional stream of
commerce theory established in the majority opinion of World-Wide Volkswagen^^^
The court found that Corchran intentionally placed its products into the stream
of commerce by delivering them to a shipper destined for delivery in Texas.^'*^ The
court noted that, at the time the goods left Corchran' s plant in Minnesota, Corchran not
only could have foreseen that the products might end up in Texas, it knew as a fact that
the products were going to be delivered to a specific user in Houston, Texas. ^'*'* Then
the court found the constitutionally sufficient minimum contact between Corchran and
Texas for the exercise of personal junsdiction over it.^'*^
In Ruston, the defendant in a third-party indemnification claim was a component
parts manufacturer that lacked the additional conduct required by the plurality opinion
in Asahi. The Fifth Circuit, nevertheless, reaffirmed its willingness to apply Justice
'''See Id
''' See Id.
'^^ See Supra pp.
^''^9F.2d415,420.
^^' See Id
^^^ See Id
345
See Id.
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Brennan's approach to the stream of commerce analysis in domestic cases as well as
international cases.
4. Lesnick v. Hollingsworth & Vose Co.^^
Stanley Lesnick, a Maryland resident, had smoked Kent brand cigarettes for
about twenty years when he died from lung cancer allegedly caused by the inhalation of
crocidolite asbestos which was incorporated in the Kent cigarettes' filters. Lesnick's
wife filed the action against Lorillard, Inc. (Lorillard), a New York corporation with its
principal place of business in New York, and Hollingsworth & Vose Co.
(Hollingsworth), a Massachusetts corporation with its principal place of business in
Massachusetts.^'*^ Hollingsworth filed a motion to dismiss for lack of personal
jurisdiction.
The filter medium was manufactured by Hollingsworth in Massachusetts and
was then shipped to Lorillard's cigarette manufacturing plants in Kentucky and New
Jersey where it was incorporated into the cigarettes.'''*^ Hollingsworth acknowledged
that, when it sold the material for cigarette filters to Lorillard, it placed the material in
commerce knowing that it would eventually be sold in Maryland and other states as a
component of Kent cigarettes. ^"^^ However, Hollingsworth argued that under Asahi,
^"^^ 35 F.3d 939 (4th Cir. 1994).
^'^'^
See Id. at 940. Hollingsworth had no presence in Maryland by having any office,
agent, or employee there, and it had no customers in Maryland. It was not registered to
do business there and directed no marketing effort or other activities toward the state. It
had derived less than one percent of its income fi'om Maryland through Lorillard's sale
of cigarettes there. See Id. at 946.
^^^5eeMat940.
.^49
See Id.
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mere knowledge is not enough to establish personal jurisdiction, and its activities must
have been purposefully directed toward Maryland.^^^
The Fourth Circuit adopted justice O'Connor's "purposeful availment" denied
the exercise of personal jurisdiction by Maryland over Hollingsworth on the ground that
Hollingsworth lacked needed minimum contacts with Maryland. The court noted the
Supreme Court decisions in World-Wide Volkswagen and Asahi as the precedent for the
examination of minimum contacts. Then the court summed up the law by stating that
"[t]he touchstone of the minimum contacts analysis remains that an out-of-state person
have engaged in some activities purposefully directed toward the forum state. "^^^
The Fourth Circuit denied plaintiffs contention that the state does not exceed
the limit of its judicial power if it asserts personal jurisdiction over a corporation that
delivered its products into the stream of commerce with the expectation that they will
be purchased in the forum state. Even if the arrangement between Lorillard and
Hollingsworth represents some conduct beyond the mere sale to Lorillard of filter
material, the court stated that "it does not rise to the level of establishing jurisdiction
because none of the conduct is in any way directed toward the state of Maryland."
The court found that HoUingsworth's lacked minimum contacts with Maryland
because Hollingsworth had not engaged in any activities purposefully directed toward
the forum state. For the example, the court noted that Hollingsworth had not done any
of the activities that satisfy Justice O'Connor's additional conducts requirement. The
350
See Id at94\.
^^' /J. at 945.
^^^ See Id &X 946.
^^^ Id at 946-47.
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court noted that Hollingsworth had not changed production to comply with Maryland
regulations nor had it set up a customer relations network there.
^^'^
5. Bond V. Octagon Process, Inc?^^
In Bond, a Federal District Court in Georgia denied application of the traditional
stream of commerce theory and required the defendant to have more sufficient contacts
with the forum state in order to exercise personal jurisdiction. The plaintiff Oliver
Bond, a national guard member, suffered injuries from using a cleaning solvent while
he was engaged in service for the National Guard in Georgia. ''^^ The solvent was
manufactured by Octagon Process, Inc. (Octagon), a New Jersey corporation, for the
sale only to the U.S. government. The product had never been sold to any private
purchaser. Plaintiff filed an action in Georgia against Octagon to recover for the
damage alleging that Bond's injuries were caused by the defendant's failure to provide
ICO
adequate warnings of the dangers of exposure to solvents at low temperatures.
Octagon sought dismissal based on the lack of personal jurisdiction. ^^^
A Federal District Court in Georgia denied the exercise of personal jurisdiction
of Georgia over Octagon on the ground that "Asahi had made it clear that defendant's
mere awareness that its products would reach the forum state via the stream of
^^^SeeId.dX9A6Al.
^^' 745 F. Supp. 710 (M.D.Ga. 1990).
^^"^ See Id. at 710.
^^'' Seeld.dXlU.
^^^ See Id.
''' See Id.
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commerce was not enough to form sufficient minimum contacts." The court stated
that "[a]s Asahi makes clear, the essential question is whether the defendant, regardless
of his status as a manufacturer or distributor, has done some act purposefully directed
toward the forum state so as to form sufficient minimum contacts with the state such
that he could anticipate being haled into court there. "^^' Then the court held that, when
Octagon sold the solvent to the Department of Defense, which acted as the independent
distributor of Octagon, Octagon merely placed its product into the stream of commerce
and had done no other conduct purposefully directed toward Georgia.
Plaintiff claimed that Asahi should be distinguished from cases like this, in
which both of the parties were Americans. Plaintiff argued that the main reason that the
Supreme Court found a lack of jurisdiction over Asahi was that the exercise of
jurisdiction over Asahi would impose on Asahi the unique burdens of defending itself in
a foreign legal system. ^^'' Plaintiff stressed that where both of the parties were
Americans, the burden on the defendant to defend itself in the forum state was not so
severe.
However, the Bond Court did not distinguish the domestic case from Asahi in
determining whether the defendant had minimum contacts with the forum state. The
court stated that plaintiffs contention concerned whether exercising jurisdiction over
the defendant was reasonable or not, and it had nothing to do with whether the
defendant had sufficient minimum contacts with the forum state. ^^'^ Thus, the Bond
^^' Mat 713-14.
'^' Mat 714.
^^^ See Id
^^-' See Id
'^' See Id
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court refused to distinguish between international cases and domestic cases in the
application of the stream of commerce theory.
6. Rodriguez v. Fullerton Tires Corp}^^
In Rodriguez, following the Supreme Court decision in Asahi, a Federal District
Court in Puerto Rico expressly rejected the application of the stream of commerce
theory. When a Puerto Rico resident, Amesto Rodriguez, was inflating a tire, the tire
suddenly exploded and the tire rim broke into two pieces that hit his hand. Rodriguez's
right hand was permanently injured by the accident.^^ Rodriguez filed a products
liability action in Puerto Rico against Fullerton Tires Corp. (Fullerton), a California tire
dealer, alleging that the rim breakage was caused by a defect in the product and/or a
defect in the manufacturing or design of the rim.^^'' Fullerton, in turn, filed a third-party
complaint against Custom Metal Spinning Corporation (Custom Metal), a California
tire rim manufacturer, who sold the tire rim at issue to Fullerton in California. Custom
Metal filed a motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction.
Fullerton argued that Custom Metal was a manufacturer of sand racing tire rims,
and it could foresee that its tire rim would be used for sand racmg in Puerto Rico where
the climate and topography were amenable to make sand racing a conceivable and
foreseeable sport.^^^ Thus, Fullerton argued that Custom Metal "made deliberate efforts
365 937F. Supp. 122(D. P.R. 1996).
^^SeeIci.aX\23.
367
See Id. diXUA.
^^^ See Id
88
to serve, either directly or indirectly, a potential market by placing [its] product in the
stream of commerce. "^^^
The Federal District Court in Puerto Rico refused to adopt Fullerton's argument
on the ground that the United States Supreme Court in Asahi refused to adopt the
stream of commerce theory.^^^ To supjx)rt its decision, the court stated that: "Such
argument, if accepted without the added requirement of minimum contacts, would open
a Pandora's Box which could release the evils of universal jurisdiction upon all sand-
racing equipment manufacturers. Such companies would be forced to litigate claims on
every tropical island where sand-buggies are driven, regardless of whether the
manufacturers of the product intended to market their product in any particular
,,371
region.
Then the court held that Custom Metal did not have sufficient minimum
contacts with Puerto Rico because it did not have perform any activities in Puerto Rico
and it did not purposefully avail itself of the privilege of conducting business in Puerto
Rico. " The court noted that merely to place its products into the stream of commerce
in California was not enough to find that it had purposefully availed itself of any market
where tires containing its rims were sold by its customer. '
'''
Id.
^""^
See Id. 3X125-26.
^^'/c/. at 126.
^''^ See Id. ax \2%-29.
"'' See Dalmau Rodriguez v. Hughes Aircraft Co., 781 F.2d 9 (1st Cir. 1986).
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7. Analysis
The defendant in the third-party indemnification claim in Asahi was a foreign
corporation and the Court considered defendant's foreign status in the fairness and
reasonableness test. The Supreme Court noted that the "unique burdens placed upon
one who must defend oneself in a foreign legal system" should be given significant
weight in evaluating the fairness and reasonableness factors.^'''' The Supreme Court did
not make it clear whether the constitutional restraint on the stream of commerce theory
would be applied in the same way to domestic cases. However, the lower courts after
Asahi have carried over Justice O'Connor's narrow approach to the stream of
commerce in the domestic cases as well.
In Bond, a Federal District Court in Georgia found minimum contacts lacking
between a New Jersey manufacturer and the State of Georgia on the ground that the
stream of commerce alone was not enough to allow the forum state to exert jurisdiction
where the product was sold outside the state and distributed by another for use there. In
the same way, in Boit, the First Circuit denied the assertion of Maine's jurisdiction over
an Indiana corporation on the ground that the defendant did not purposefully engage in
forum activities so that it could reasonably expect to be haled into court there where its
product was sold by a national retailer. In Lesnic, the Fourth Circuit also required
defendant's purposeful activities toward the forum state for the exercise of forum
state's jurisdiction stating that to sell material to a national cigarette manufacturer was
not enough. And, in Rodriguez, a Federal District Court in Puerto Rico also rejected the
pure stream of commerce theory and held jurisdiction was lacking over a California tire
rim manufacturer that sold its products to another California company that in turn
marketed them to the forum state. Only the Seventh Circuit in Derhmlow was prepared
to uphold jurisdiction under the traditional stream of commerce rationale and even that
"•^480 U.S. at 114.
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court identified some direct contacts between the manufacturer and the forum state
rather than rely exclusively on the stream of commerce rationale.
E. Assessment of the Court Decisions
Asahi was not an appropriate case for addressing the confusion in minimum
contact theory after World-Wide Volkswagen:^^ First, Asahi was not named as a
defendant by the plaintiff, but was brought into the suit by the original defendant by
third-party indemnification claim. Second, the underlying suit between plaintiff and
defendant had already settled, and no forum State's resident was involved in the
indemnification claim as a party. Third, the real issue was not the protection of a forum
resident, but the interpretation of the contract between the Taiwanese company and the
Japanese company that had been entered into Japan or Taiwan. The lower courts after
Asahi could easily distinguish the cases in front of them from Asahi. Instead, the lower
courts have turned Asahi 's doubts about stream of commerce into a constitutional
constraint on personal jurisdiction.
In Asahi, the foreign defendant was a component parts manufacturer whose
products were incorporated into the finished products in another foreign country before
they were shipped to the U.S. market for sale. By and large, in light ofAsahi, American
courts today tend not to find a jurisdictionally sufficient level of contacts to allow
personal jurisdiction over the foreign manufacturer of component parts. Moreover, the
courts in the United States have applied Justice O'Connor's narrow approach in Asahi
to the stream of commerce theor>' even when the defendants are finished product
manufacturers or their U.S. distributors. When the foreign corporation does not engage
^^^See Sara Wheeler, Personal Jurisdiction: Foreign Manufacturer not Subject to
Domestic Jurisdiction in Absence ofMinimum Contact, 22 Tex. Int l L.J. 403, 406-07
(1987).
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in purposeful activities in the forum state, the lower courts typically refer to Asahi to
deny the finding ofminimum contacts on the ground that the foreign companies had not
engaged in the additional conduct required by Justice O'Connor. Moreover, Justice
O'Connor's approach to the stream of commerce has been applied even in domestic
cases in which the manufacturer was simply located in another American state.
In Asahi, the Justices were sharply divided into three opinions on the issue of
how to use the stream of commerce to find minimum contacts. Reflecting the diversity
in the opinions in the Supreme Court, lower courts also divided regarding whether they
will maintain the efficacy of the stream of commerce theory. Therefore, even after
Asahi, some courts have adhered to the pre-Asahi case law and have continued to use
the stream of commerce rationale as Justice Brennan's opinion warrants, citing the
absence of clear guidance from the Supreme Court in Asahi. The confusion among the
courts has come at the expense of the predictability and foreseeability that foreign
manufacturers and distributors need in order to know whether they will be subject to
jurisdiction in the courts of the United States.
Chapter V. Jurisdiction in Other Countries
The scope of personal jurisdiction in the United States can be compared with
that used in the legal system of other countries. Civil law countries take different
approaches on the issue of whether they have jurisdiction over a foreign company. The
analysis and comparison of these judicial systems is useful and valuable for
understanding and for the future development of the United States' legal system. This
chapter discusses the exercise of jurisdiction over foreign companies whose products
caused injuries to their residents by European civil law countries. In addition,
considering the increase of trade and resulting legal controversies between Japanese
corporations and residents of the United States, this article examines the Japanese
judicial view on this important procedural issue.
A. Germany
The courts of Germany decide the limits of judicial power of Germany over
foreigners through the interpretation of venue provisions of the German Code of Civil
Procedure {Zivilpozessordnung, ZPO).^^^ Under the ZPO, a plaintiff can sue a
defendant at the place of defendant's domicile when the defendant is a natural
person,"^ or at the place of its seat when the defendant is a legal person or other
entities. Therefore, when a defendant has a domicile or seat in a foreign country, the
'^^ These rules are primarily provided in terms of allocation of cases among various
courts in Germany.
ZPO §§ 12, 13. The provision spells out the Roman law principle of actor sequrtur
forum rei.
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courts of Germany in principle do not have jurisdiction over the defendant, and the
plaintiff must go to foreign country to sue the defendant under these provisions.
However, in addition to this general jurisdiction that is decided by defendant's
domicile or seat, the ZPO further provides specific jurisdiction. Section 32 provides
that the court of the district where the tortious act is conducted has jurisdiction for
actions in tort. The purposes of this provision is to achieve procedural economy
(especially the access to evidence) and to avoid unfairness to force the tort victim to go
to the place of tortfeasor's general jurisdiction to seek redress. ^^^ While the meaning of
tortious act has been disputed, it is generally recognized that section 32 provides a basis
for jurisdiction at the place of the event as well as at the place where that event results
m damage. Therefore, when a foreign company sends a product to Germany and the
product caused an injury in Germany, the German court has jurisdiction over the foreign
company for the claim of redress of injury caused by the defendant's product. While
defendant's contacts with a forum State is an important element in the United States, in
Germany the contacts of defendants with Germany are not considered. ''^" Foreign
companies will be subject to Germany's judicial power, as long as their products cause
injuries in Germany, notwithstanding their intention or knowledge of the destination of
their products. Thus German courts have a wide range of jurisdiction over foreign
ZPO § 17 (1). Corporations must choose one of the following three places as the
seat of the corporation in the article of association: the location where the management
is situated, the location where the corporation maintains an establishment, or the
location where the admmistration of the corporation is conducted. Akt Ges § 5 (2).
ZPO § 32 provided that : "[f]or actions in tort the court of the district within which
the tortious act was committed has jurisdiction."
2QA
Christof Von Dryander, Jurisdiction in Civil and Commercial Matters under the
German Code ofCivil Procedure, 16 Int i. Law. 671, 687-88 (1982).
^^^ See Id at 690.
^^\See Id. ai 690-92.
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companies in product liabilit\' cases under the German law. Even in the cases like
World-Wide Volkswagen or Asahi, German courts acquire a judicial power over foreign
383
companies.
B. France
While France also belongs to the civil law countries like Germany, France takes
a completely different approach than Germany on the issue of international jurisdiction.
Under Article 14 of the Code Civil; every French national can sue a foreigner in a
French court without regard to the contacts of defendant with France. Article 14 of
the Code Civil depends exclusively upon the French nationality of the plaintiff, and
defendant's domicile, residence or presence in France are not required at all for the
TO/-
exercise of a French court's jurisdiction over foreigners. Further, French courts have
given an expansive interpretation to this clause, and they construed that the term of
"obligation" in Article 14 to refer not only to contractual situations but also to any legal
duties, notwithstanding the nature of the cause of the claim. ^^'' Therefore, when a
TO!
In World-Wide Volkswagen, the notion that amenability to suit of the seller of
chattels would travel with the chattel is vigorously rejected by the Supreme Court of the
United States. See supra note 3 1
.
^^ Code Civil Article 14 provided that:
An alien, though not residing in France, can be cited before the French
courts, for the performance of obligations contracted by him in France
with a Frenchman; he can be brought before French courts for obligations
contracted by him in a foreign country toward Frenchmen.
Henry P. deVries & Andreas F. Lowenfeld, Jurisdiction in Personal Actions-A
Comparison ofCivil Law Views, 44 Iowa L. Rhv. 306, 317 (1959).
''' See Id
See Id. at 320. See also Comp. Du Brittannia v. Comp. Du Phenix, Cour de
Cassation, Ch. Reg., Dec. 13, 1842, 43 Sirey 1, 14,
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French national suffered injuries by the defective product of a foreign company, he can
sue the company in a court of France, not withstanding the place of injury.
Internal venue rules have also been applied to determine the international
jurisdiction of French courts. French courts have used these rules to provide bases for
adjudicatory jurisdiction when neither plaintiff nor defendant is of French nationality,
and Articles 14 and Article 15 are inapplicable.^^* As do most civil law countries,
France follows the general principle actor seqmtur forum rei, and therefore plaintiff
2QQ
must sue at defendant's domicile. However, other domestic venue rules relating to
the place of the activities out of which the litigation arises have also become rules of
adjudicatory jurisdiction in international cases. Article 20 provides that in a tort action
the complaint may also be filed in the tribunal where the act causing the injury took
place. Therefore, when a foreign citizen is injured by a foreign company's defective
product in France, he can sue the foreign company in France based on Article 20.
C. Brussels Convention
To determine the international jurisdiction of member countries and to facilitate
the recognition and enforcement of judgments, six members of the European
Community (Belgium, Germany, France, Italy, Luxembourg and Netherlands) signed
the Convention on the Jurisdiction and the Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and
Commercial Matters on September 27, 1968 (Brussels Convention). '''' Then the
Brussels Convention extended its area to other European Community member
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Henry J. Steineret et al.. Transnational Legal Problems 708 (4th ed. 1994).
•jon
" Code de Procedure Civile, art. 59 sec. 1
^^ See Henry et al., supra note 204, at 708.
^^^ Sep. 27, 1968, 15 J.O. (L 299) 32.
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countries.''^" Further, the member countries of the Brussels Convention joined in the
Convention on Junsdiction and the Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial
Matters at Lugano on 16 September 1988 (Lugano Convention) with the six member
countries of the European Free Trade Association.''^^ Through the Lugano Convention,
the regime of the Brussels Convention was extended to all of western Europe.
The Brussels Convention sets forth that the defendant's domicile has general
jurisdiction.^^'* In the case of a company, its principle place of busmess is treated as its
domicile.^^^ The Brussels Convention expressly excludes the applicability of Article 14
of the Code Civil of France, and Article 23 of the German Code of Civil Procedure
when a person in a signatory country sues another person in another signatory
country. Moreover, the Convention further provides special jurisdiction in several
matters. ^^^ Under Article 5, No. 3 of the Convention, "the courts for the place where
the harmful event occurred" have jurisdiction "in matters relating to tort."''^^ The
European Court of Justice construed the clause broadly and held that victims of tortious
acts may sue either at the place whether the tortious acts were committed or at the place
where the damage occurred. Therefore, when a person of a signatory country of the
" The Convention was first revised to accommodate the accession of Denmark, Ireland
and the United Kingdom. 1978 O.J. (L 304) 77. It was again amended upon the
accession of Greece, 1982 O.J. (L 388) 1, Spain and Portugal, 1989 O.J. (L 285) 1.
^^^ These six member countries of European Free Trade Association are Austria,
Switzerland, Norway, Sweden, Finland and Iceland.
^^^
Brussels Convention, supra note 206, article 2, par 1
.
^^^ Brussels Convention, supra note 206, article 53, par 1
.
^^^ Brussels Convention, supra note 206, article 3.
^^^ Brussels Convention, supra note 206, article 5.
300
Brussels Convention, supra note 206, article 5, No. 3.
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Convention is injured by a defective product sold by a company of another signatory
country of the Convention, he can sue the company in the court of his domicile if that is
where the injury occurred.
The Brussels Convention is applied only for the cases between parties belonging
to the signatory countries, and it is not extended to the cases when citizens of non-
signatory countries are involved in the controversy/*^ In such cases. Code Civil of
France or the German Code of Civil Procedure are applied, and those countries have a
wide range ofjurisdiction over foreign companies as described above.
D. Japan
Although, the Japanese Code of Civil Procedure (Minsoho) does not have
specific provisions that provide for international jurisdiction, like Germany, the courts
of Japan decide the limits of international jurisdiction through the interpretation of the
venue provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure set out for the internal territorial
jurisdiction. However, when the application of the internal venue provisions to
international settings would lead to unfair results for the parties, Japanese courts deny
the exercise ofjurisdiction of Japan in accordance with the principle ofjustice. Several
cases illustrate this principle in practice.
1. Goto V. Malaysian Airline System Berhad
In Goto V. Malaysian Airline System Berhad^^^ the Supreme Court of Japan
clearly articulated the principle of international jurisdiction."*^"^ In Goto, an airplane of
^^^ Judgment 30, 1976, Court of Justice of European Community, cas 21/76 8 ECR
1735 (1976). See also Chnstof Von Dryander, supra note 197, at 688.
400
Henry J. Steiner et al
,
supra note 204, at 710.
''"' 35 MiNSHu 1224 (Sup. Ct., Oct. 16, 1981).
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Malaysian Airline System Berhad (Malaysian Airline) flying from Penang to Kuala
Lumpur crashed in Johore Bahm in Malaysia and all crew and passengers died. The
successors of one of the Japanese passengers filed a claim seeking compensation for
damages in Nagoya District Court of Japan against Malaysian Airline alleging the
breach of an air transport contract.
'^^'^
The Court held that the limits of international jurisdiction should be decided in
accordance with the principle of justice that would secure the impartiality between
parties and a speedy and fair trial, and the internal venue provisions set out in the Code
of Civil Procedure served this purpose. ''^^ Then the Court applied article 4 paragraph 3
of the Code of Civil Procedure"**^ and affirmed the exercise of the jurisdiction of Japan
"^^"^ The Supreme Court of Japan held that the jurisdictional power of the country should
be exercised as an effect of the national sovereignty and the scope of jurisdiction shall
in principle be tantamount to that of the national sovereignty. Therefore, if a defendant
is a foreign company which has its head office abroad, it is generally beyond the
jurisdiction of Japan, unless it is willing to subject itself to the jurisdiction of Japan.
However, if a case is concerned with the land of Japan or if a defendant has a legal
connection with Japan, he can be exceptionally subject to the jurisdiction of Japan,
notwithstanding his nationality or residence. Id. at 1226.
'''See Id.
^^ See Id.
"^^ See Id. As such places set forth in the internal venue provisions of the Code of Civil
Procedure, the Court indicated the domicile of the defendant (Minsoho art. 2), the place
of the principle office or principle place of the business (Minsoho art. 4), the place
where the obligation is performed (Minsoho art. 5), the place where the defendant's
property is located (Minsoho art. 8), and a place of tort (Minsoho art. 15).
'^ Code of Civil Procedure Article 4 provides that:
1 The general forum of a judicial person or any other association or
foundation shall be determined by the place of its principle office or
principle place of business, or in case there is no office or place of
business, by the domicile of the principle person in charge of its affairs.
2 [Omitted]
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over the Malaysian corporation based on the facts that the defendant appointed its
representative in Japan and it had established a place of business in Tokyo.
2. Yabutani v. The Boeing Co.
In Yabutani v. The Boeing Co., the Tokyo District Court more concretely
examined fairness factors. In Yabutani, the successors of the deceased passengers who
died in a crash of a Boeing 727 in Japan filed products liability actions against the
Boeing Company (Boemg), an American airplane manufacturer, m Tokyo District
Court seeking compensation of deaths. The Tokyo District Court affirmed the exercise
of Japanese jurisdiction over the American company holding that "the place where the
act was committed'" in Article 15 paragraph 1 of Japanese Code of Civil Procedure"*^^
included both of "the place of injurious act" and "the place of effect."
The court went on to state that, in determining international jurisdiction, the
court must consider which court would be appropriate for deciding the lawsuits
correctly, impartially and efficiently. The court stated that when the burden on the
defendant to defend the lawsuit at "the place of effect" was markedly greater than the
benefit to the plaintiff and the convenience for the collection of evidence, the
jurisdiction at "the place of effect" should be denied by the principles ofjustice.
3 In regard to the general forum of a foreign association or
foundation, the provisions of paragraph 1 shall apply to the office, place
of business or person in charge of its affairs in Japan.
Even though the accident was not related with defendant's business in Japan, the
Court affirmed the application of Article 4 paragraph 3 of Japanese Code of Civil
Procedure. See 35 Minshu 1224, 1227.
*^^ 754 Hanrei JiHo 58 (Tok7o District Court, July 24, 1974).
''^^ Code of Civil Procedure Article 15 provides that:
1 A suit relating to a tort may be brought before the court of the
place where the act was committed
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However, in this case, the court found that: (1) defendant was a corporation
possessing large amount of capital and engaged in the manufacture of aircraft capable
of flying all over the world, (2) many of defendant's products were manufactured to be
used in Japan and defendant could foresee the lawsuit in Japan, (3) if the case were held
in the United States, plaintiffs expenses and efforts in pursuing the litigation would be
overwhelming so that it was practically impossible for the plaintiff to sue the defendant
in the United States, and (4) to decide which country was more convenient to collect the
evidence was too difficult at the first stage of the litigation.
3. Shinzaki Bussan v. Nankaseimen Co.
In Shinzaki Bussan v. Nankaseimen Co.^^^ an American employee who was
injured by a defective machine manufactured by Shinzaki Bussan sued Shinzaki Bussan
and an American importer of the machine in California court. In response to the
indemnification claim from the importer of the machine, Shinzaki Bussan filed a claim
in Tokyo District Court seeking negative declaration of liability to pay damages."*"
Under the Japanese Code of Civil Procedure, the Japanese court had
jurisdiction.'*'^ However, the Tokyo District Court denied the exercise ofjurisdiction of
Japan over the American importer stating that the exercise of jurisdiction by Japan
would be unfair and unreasonable in this case.
2 [Omitted]
^'- 1390 Hanji 98 (Tokyo District Court, Jan. 29, 1991)
^" /J. at 99.
"^'^ See supra note 226. The court stated that "the place where the act was committed"
in the article 15 paragraph 1 of Japanese Code of Civil Procedure includes "the place of
the injurious act was committed."
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As the fairness factors, the court noted that: (1) there was some possibility of an
inconsistent result between the American litigation and Japanese litigation, (2) most of
the evidence was located in the United States, (3) plaintiff had benefited from the sale
of its products in the United States, (4) the litigation in the United States was
foreseeable for the Japanese manufacturer, and (5) the American importer could not
foresee being sued in Japan.
4. Shinagawa Hakurenga Co.^ v. Houston Technical Ceramics Inc.
In Shinagawa Hakurenga Co., Ltd. v. Houston Technical Ceramics Inc.^^^
Shinagawa Hakurenga Co., (Shinagawa Hakurenga), a Japanese ceramic manufacturing
company, sold ceramic products to Houston Technical Ceramics Inc., (Houston
Technical Ceramics), an American company. Houston Technical Ceramics filed a suit
in Texas seeking damages sustained as a result of the defective products of Shinagawa
Hakurenga in accordance with the Texas Deceptive Trade Practice Act. In response,
Shinagawa Hakurenga filed this action in Japan seeking a declaration that the plaintiff
was not liable to pay any damages to the defendant.
Although the Tokyo District Court found a sufficient basis for the exercise of
jurisdiction under the venue provision of Japanese Code of Civil Procedure, the court
further stated that when exceptional circumstances made the exercise of jurisdiction
unfair, the court must deny the assertion ofjurisdiction.
Then the court considered the advantage and disadvantage to the parties to
pursue the litigation in Japan or in the United States. The court found that: (1) the
witness about the defects of the products was in Japan, (2) even though Houston
Technical Ceramics sued Shinagawa Hakurenga in Texas, general venue of Shinagawa
Hakurenga was situated in Japan, (3) even if Houston Technical Ceramics won the suit
413
703 Hanrei Taimuzu 246 (Tokyo Distnct Court, 1989).
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in Texas, it must enforce the judgment only in Japan, and (4) the case arose out of
international trading between companies and the litigation in Japan was not against the
expectation of Houston Technical Ceramics. Then the court concluded that the exercise
of jurisdiction of Japan over Houston Technical Ceramics did not violate the principle
of fairness between the parties.
Thus, like Asahi, Japanese courts consider the fairness factors like the
foreseeability to the defendant of suit in a particular forum, location of the evidence, the
possibility of inconsistent judgments and what kind of benefit had the defendant
obtained in the forum, for the exercise of jurisdiction over foreigners. These
considerations are quite similar to the fairness and reasonableness factors in Asahi.
However, unlike Asahi, Japanese courts look defendant's contacts with the forum as
only one of the fairness factors and do not make such contacts a precondition as do
American courts.
Chapter VI. Conclusion
Prior to Asahi, foreign manufacturers and distributors who placed their products
into the stream of commerce with the expectation that their products would reach the
forum state could be subjected to the jurisdiction of the forum state where the products
caused harm to residents.'^''* The stream of commerce theory provided a sufficient basis
for the forum state to exert its judicial power outside its territorial boundaries. After
Asahi, these same foreign manufacturers and distributors are not subject to the forum
state's jurisdiction unless they had direct contacts with the forum state. By requiring
defendant's additional conduct, a plurality of the Supreme Court in Asahi has allowed
these foreign manufacturers and distributors to effectively immunize themselves from
suit by many injured plaintiffs. The decision in Asahi placed both American residents
and American manufacturers in a disadvantageous position against foreign companies.
First, by virtue of constitutional constraints on a state's jurisdiction, American
residents can not recover for damages caused by defective products manufactured by a
foreign company which does not have direct contacts with the forum state. Most
foreign Component parts manufacturers will not have any of the additional contacts
'*''*
In Nelson v. Park Industries, Inc. 1\1 F.2d 1 120 (7th Cir. 1983), the Seventh Circuit
affirmed the exercise of personal jurisdiction under Wisconsin long-arm statute over a
Hong-Kong manufacturer and distributor on the ground that they placed their products
into the stream of commerce with awareness that their products would be sold in the
United States by their American distributor, a national retail chain. The Hong Kong
manufacturer and distributor argued that they did not originate the distribution system
and they had no control over the distribution in the United States. However, the
Seventh Circuit held that they should reasonably anticipate being subject to suit in any
forum within that market where their product caused injury, as far as they were aware
of the distribution system in the United States and benefited from the sales in the United
States. See Id. at 1 124-26. This case was cited by Justice Brennan in Asahi. See Asahi
480 U.S. 102, 117 note 1.
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listed by Justice O'Connor and even finished product manufacturers can often arrange
to sell their products to U.S. distributors without establishing direct contacts with any
particular state. Once a court has found that the defendant does not have direct contacts
with the forum state, the court will usually deny the exercise of the forum state's
jurisdiction even though the state has a strong interest in adjudicating the case. In a
domestic case, a plaintiff who is compelled to sue the manufacturer of a component or
finished product in its home state can still obtain legal redress. At worst, there is
inconvenience and extra expense to the plaintiff, but at least there is viability to the
products liability claim since it can be tried in an American court within the a same
legal system. On the other hand, when an injured plaintiffs sue foreign manufacturers
or distributors, they must bring the suit in the courts of the foreign country where the
language and legal system are completely different. The plaintiff who is forced to
pursue a litigation in a foreign legal system is faced with a serious burden. To
immunize a foreign company from suit in the state where its product caused harm may
deprive forum residents of the right to recover damages. This result is inconsistent with
the notion of products liability which should provide compensation for harm to injured
persons. The cost of injuries resulting from defective products should be borne by the
manufacturers that put such products on the market rather than by the injured persons
who are powerless to protect themselves.
Second, the limitation by Justice O'Connor on the stream of commerce theory
places American manufacturers and distributors in a disadvantageous position as a
result of their exposure to suits in civil law countries. If a product manufactured in the
United States causes an injury in one of these civil law countries, the injured person has
a specific jurisdiction over the American manufacturer for the claim of redress.
Therefore, when the American manufacturers export their products to civil law
countries, they must include in the cost of goods expenses associated with potential
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products liability litigation in the foreign countries. On the other hand, in the United
States, an additional conducts requirement removes from domestic court jurisdiction
foreign manufacturers and distributors whose sole contacts with the forum state come
from putting their products in the stream of commerce destined for the U.S. market.
Therefore, when the foreign manufacturers or distributors export their products to the
United States, they can avoid the payment of high insurance costs by virtue of immunity
from the exercise of any particular state's jurisdiction. As a result, foreign
manufacturers can potentially enjoy a competitive advantage over the United States
manufacturers in both domestic and international marketplaces. Since it is neither
unfair nor unreasonable that jurisdiction is exerted over manufacturers who benefit
economically from sales to residents of the forum state, due process should not be
construed to grant foreign manufacturers exemption from jurisdiction.
Certainly component part manufacturers and distributors usually do not have
control over the distribution systems of the finished products in the foreign country.
However, as they make their specific products to be sold in the forum state, they can
usually foresee the final destination of their products as far as the products will be sold
through normal course of business. From the business viewpoint, those manufacturer
and distributors have clear notice where their products will be sold and could cause
harm. Jurisdiction could be made foreseeable. The courts of the United States should
exert their jurisdiction over foreign manufacturers and distributors whose products
cause injury as far as their products reach the forum state through the normal course of
business.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
1. Articles and Books
• Yvonne Luketich Blaauvelt, Personal Jurisdiction After Asahi Metal Industry Co.,
V. Superior Court ofCalifornia, 49 Ohio St.L.J. 853 (1988).
• Yvonne Luketich Blauveh, Personal Jurisdiction After Asahi Metal Industry Co. v.
Superior Court ofCalifornia, 49 Ohio St. L.J. 853 (1988).
• Gray B. Bom, Reflections on Judicial Jurisdiction in International Cases, 17 Ga. J.
Intl&Comp. L. 1 (1987).
• Gray B. Born & David Westin, International Civil Litigation in United States
Courts: Commentary and Materials 78 (2ci ed. 1992).
• Stephen B. Burbank, Practice and Procedure: The World in Our Courts, 89 Mich.
L. Rev. 1456(1991).
• R. Lawrence Dessem,: The Personal Jurisdiction After Asahi Other (International)
Shoe Drops, 55 Tenn. L.Rev. 41 (1987).
• Henry P. DeVries & Andreas F. Lowenfeld, Jurisdiction in Personal Action-A
Comparison ofCivil Law Views, 44 Iowa L.Rev. 306 ( 1959).
• Christof Von Dryander, Jurisdiction in Civil and Commercial Matters under the
German Code ofCivil Procedure, 16 Int l Law, 671 (1982).
• John P. Ekberg, Limitation on Jurisdiction Over Component Parts Manufacturers in
Products Liability Actions, 1 1 J. Prod. Liab. 55 (1988).
• Friedrich K. Juenger, Judicial Jurisdiction in the United States and in the European
Communities: A Comparison, 82 Mich. L. Rev. 1 195 (1984).
106
107
• Friedrich K. Juenger, Fifty Years of International Shoe: The Past and Future of
PersonalJurisdiction, 28 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 1027 (1995).
• Kevin C. Kennedy, Strechmg the Long-Arm in Asahi Metal Industry Co., Ltd. v.
Superior Court: Worlwide Jurisdiction After World-Wide Volkswagen?, 4 B.U.
Intl L.J. 327(1986).
• Arthur Lenhoff, International Law and Rules on International Jurisdiction, 50
Cornell Law Quarterly 5 (1964).
• Erik T. Moe, Asahi Metal Industry Co. v. Superior Court: The Stream ofDoctrine,
Barely Alive but still Kicking Asahi Metal Industry Co. v. Superior, 76 Geo. L.J. 203
(1987).
• Bruce N. Morton, Contacts, Fairness and State Interests: Personal Jurisdiction
Asahi Metal Industry Co. v. Superior Court of California, 9 Pace L. Rev. 451
(1989).
• Mollie A. Murphy, Personal Jurisdiction and the Stream of Commerce Theory: a
Reappraisal and a Revised Approach, 11 Ky. L.J. 243 (1989).
• Bruch Posnak, The Court Doesn V Know its Asahi from its Wortman: a Critical
View of The Constitutional Constraints of Jurisdiction and Choice of Law, 4
1
Syracuse L. Rev. 875 (1990).
• Dayton B. Parcells III, A Foreign Manufacturer Which Makes No Direct Sales in
California May be Required to Defend a Products Liability Action in California if
the Corporation Has Sufficient Contacts with California, Avails Itself of the
California Market, and It is Reasonable to Require the Corporation to Defend a
Lawsuit in California: Asahi Metal Industry Co., Ltd. v. Superior Court, 13 Pepp.
L. Rev. 427(1986).
108
• Linda J. Silberman, Developments in Jurisdiction and Forum Non Conveniences in
Litigation: Thoughts on Reform and a Proposal for a Uniform Standard, 28 Tex.
IntlL.J. 501 (1993).
• Linda J. Silberman, "Two Cheers"for International Shoe (And Nonefor Asahi) : an
Essay on the Fiftieth Anniversary ofInternational Shoe, 28 U.C. Davis L. Rev 755
(1995).
• Howard B. Stravitz, Sayonara to Minimum Contacts: Asahi Metal Industry Co. v.
Superior Court, 39 S.C.L.Rev. 729 (1988).
• Henry J. Steineret et al. Transnational Legal Problems 708 (4 th ed. 1994).
• Sara Wheeler, Personal Jurisdiction-Foreign Manufacturer Not Subject to
Domestic Jurisdiction in Absence of Minimum Contacts. 22 Tex. Intl L.J. 403
(1987).
• Christine M. Wiseman, Reconstructing the Citadel: The Advent ofJurisdictional
Privity, 54 Ohio St. L.J. 403 (1993).
2. Cases
Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1877).
Milliken v. Meyer, ?>\\ U.S. 457 (1940).
International Shoe Co. v. State of Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
Mcgee V. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220 (1957).
Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235 (1958).
United States v. First National City Bank, 379 U.S. 378 (1965).
Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 1 86 ( 1 977).
World-Wide Volkswagen v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286 (1980).
Insurance Corp., of Ireland Ltd. v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S.
694(1982).
109
Helicopteros Nationales De Colobmis v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408 (1984).
Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462 (1985).
Asahi Metal Industry Co. v. Superior Court ofCalifornia, 480 U.S. 102 (1987).
Data Disc, Inc. v. Systems Technology Ass% 557 F.2ci 1280 (9th Cir. 1977).
Stabilisierungsfonds Fur Wein v. Kaiser Stuhl Wine Distrib. Pty. Ltd., 647 F.2d 200
(D.C. Cir. 1981).
Hahn v. Vermont Law School, 698 F.2d 48 (1st Cir. 1983).
Hadrick v. Daiko Shoji Co., Ltd, 715 F.2d 1355 (9th Cir. 1983).
Nelson v. Park Industries, Inc., 717 F.2d 1 120 (7th Cir. 1983).
Bean Dredging Corp. v. Dredge Technology Corp., 744 F.2d 1081 (5th Cir. 1984).
Humble v. Toyota Motor Co., Ltd, 111 F.2d 709 (8th Cir. 1984).
Mason v. Lli Luigi and Franco Dal Maschio, 832 F.2d 383 (7th Cir. 1987).
Benitez-Allende v. Alcan Alumino Do Brasil, 857 F.2d 26 (1st Cir. 1988).
Irving V. Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp., 864 F.2d 383 (5th Cir. 1989).
Falkirk Mining Co. v. Japan Steel Works, Ltd., 906 F.2d 369 (8th Cir. 1990).
Soo Line Railroad Co. v. Hawker Siddeley Canada, Inc., 950 F.2d 526 (8th Cir.
1991).
Vermeulen v. Renauh U.S.A., Inc., 975 F.2d 746 (1 1th Cir. 1992).
Boit V. Gar-Tec Products, Inc., 967 F.2d 671 (1st Cir. 1992).
Dehmlow v. Austin Fireworks, 963 F.2d 941 (7th Cir. 1992).
Tobin V. Astra Pharmaceutical Products, Inc., 993 F.2d 528 (6th Cir. 1993).
Ruston Gas Turbines, Inc., v. Donaldson Co., Inc., 9 F.3d 415 (5th Cir. 1993)
Lesnic v. Hollingsworth & Vose Co., 35 F.3d 939 (4th Cir. 1994).
Volkswagenwerk v. Klippan, 611 P.2d 498 (Alaska 1980).
Dittman v. Code-A-Phone Corp, 666 F. Supp. 1269 (N.D.Ind. 1987).
Hall V. Zambelli, 699 F. Supp. 753 (S.D.W.Va. 1987).
110
Smith V. Dainichi Kinzoku Kogyo Co., 680 F. Supp. 847 (W.D.Tex. 1988).
Wilsonm V. Kuwahara Co.,l\lY. Supp. 525 (W.D.Mich. 1989).
Perry v. Okada Hardware Co., 779 P.2d 659 (Utah 1989).
San Juan Dupont Plaza Hotel Fire Litigation, 742 F. Supp. 717 (D.P.R. 1990).
Bond\. Octagon Process, Inc., 745 F. Supp. 710 (M.D.Ga. 1990).
Haedike v. Kodiak Research, Ltd, 814 F. Supp. 679 (N.D.Ill. 1992).
Brabeau v. SMB Corp., 789 F. Supp. 873 (E.D.Mich. 1992).
Rodriguez v. Fullerton Tires Corp., 937 F. Supp. 122 (D.P.R. 1996).
Gray v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 22 111.2d 432 (1961).
Zurcher v. Dunlop Tire & Rubber Co., No. 76180 (Super. Ct., Solano County, Cal,
Apr. 20, 1983).
Asahi Metal Industry Co. v. Superior Court of California, 147 Cal.App.3d 30
(Ct.App.l985).
Asahi Metal Industry Co. v. Superior Court ofCalifornia, 39 Cal.3d 35 (1985).
Felix V. Bomoro Kommanditgesellschaft, 196 Cal. App. 3d 106 (Ct. App. 1988).
Showa Denko K.K. v. Pangle, 202 Ga. App. 245 (1991).
CRSLimitedv. Macqueen, III, 190 W.Va. 695 (1994).
Salinas v. CMMC, 903 S.W. 2d 138 (Tex. App. 1995).
3. Foreign Materials
(Germany)
• German Code of Civil Procedure (Zivilpozessordnung, ZPO).
(France)
• CoDK Dh Procedure Civile
• Comp. Du Brittannia v. Comp. Du Phenix, Cour de Cassation, Ch. Reg., Dec. 13,
1842,43Sirey 1, 14.
Ill
(Japan)
• Japanese Code of Civil Procedure (Minsoho)
• Goto V. Malaysian Airline System Berhad, 35 Minshu 1224 (Sup. Ct., Oct. 16,
1981).
• Yabutani v. The Boeing Company, ISA Hanrei Jiho 58 (Tokyo District Court, July
24, 1974).
• Shinzaki Bussan v. Nankaseimen Company, 1390 Hanrei Jmo 98 (Tokyo District
Court, Jan. 29, 1991).
• Shinagawa Hakurenga Co., Ltd. v. Houston Technical Ceramics Inc., 703 Hanrei
Taimuzu 246 (Tokyo Distnct Court, Jun. 19, 1989).
4. Treaties
• Brussels Convention, Sep. 27, 1968, 1 5 J.O. (L 299) 32.
Brussels Convention, 1978 O.J. (L 304) 77.
Brussels Convention, 1982 O.J. (L 388) 1.
Brussels Convention, 1989 O.J. (L 285) 1.
• Lugano Convention, 16 Sep. 1988.
•
•
LAW LIBRARY
MNIVFR.<;iTV oc ornooift
FOR LIBRAW
USE OL'Lr
